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I. Section 11.16.100. LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY BASED UPON CONDUCT 
Section 100 restates the basic principle of criminal law 
that criminal liability is based upon conduct. When liability 
exists, it is immaterial whether the elements of the 
crime are satisfied by the defendant's o,;..-n behavior, or 
by the behavior of another person for which he is account­
able or by both. 
II. Section 11.16.110. LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY BASED UPON THE 
CONDUCT OF ANOTHER: COMPLICITY 
Section 110 sets out the circumstances under which a 
person may be criminally liable for the conduct of another. 
Subsection (1) recognizes that liability may be imposed 
on one person for the conduct of another in a specific statute. 
As an example, a statute could provide that the owner of a 
bar who knowingly serves an intoxicated person is criminally 
liable for all crimes committed by that person while intoxicated. 
Subsection (2) provides that a person is liable as a 
traditional accomplice only if he acts "with intent to pro­
mote or facilitate the commission of the offense." Acting 
with that intent, the defendant must either solicit the offense, or 
aid or abet in the planning or commission of the offense. 
Under paragraph (A) a person is liable as an accomplice 
only if some crime is committed. If the person only 
solicits the commission of a crime, and conduct which would 
constitute a crime never occurs, the person can still be 
charged with solicitation, § 11.31.110. 
1. 
In paragraph (B) the terms II aids" and "abets II have been 
included without definition since they have been interpreted 
in a nwnber of cases. (See Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88, 
97 (AK 1971); Taylor v. State, 391 P.2d 950 (AK 1964); Mahle 
v. State, 371 P.2d 21, 25 (AK 1962); Daniels v. State, 383 P.2d
323, 324 (AK 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 979 (1964)). 
Subsection (3) provides that a defendant can be liable 
for the conduct of an innocent person or a person who lacks 
criminal responsibility if he causes that person to engage in 
the proscribed conduct. In this instance the defendant is 
only required to act with the culpable mental state required 
for the offense. For example, under § 11. 81. 440, a person 
who commits a crime under duress is not criminally liable. A 
bank robber who threatens to kill a hostage unless he drives 
at an excessive rate of speed will be guilty of manslaughter 
under subsection (3) if the hostage accidentally causes the 
death of another person. In this regard note that in§ 120(a) (2) (C) 
the Code specifically excludes as a defense to criminal liability 
based on the conduct of another person that the other person 
was not guilty of the offense. 
III. Section 11. 16. 120. EXEMPTIONS TO LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER 
Subsection (a) (1) provides that a "voluntary and complete" 
renunciation of criminal intent (defined in§ ll.81. 900(b) (48)), 
combined with steps which successfully deprive one's complicity 
of all its effectiveness in the commission of an offense will 
remove liability if the accomplice gives timely warning to 
the police. A "timely warning" would be one which notified the 
police in time to prevent the commission of the crime if they 
2.
acted upon that warning. If timely warning cannot oe maae 
by reasonable efforts, an accomplice may still avoid liability 
by making a reasonable effort to prevent the commission of the 
offense. For example, the accomplice who supplies a gun to 
be used in a planned bank robbery could avoid liability by warn­
ing the bank manager of the planned crime a day before it is to 
occur. Note that the defense is an affirmative qefense which 
the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Subsection (a) (2) lists three situations which the Code 
specifically excludes as defenses to liability for the conduct 
of another. 
Paragraph (A) eliminates the accessory's common law 
defense that the principal has not been convicted, while 
paragraph (B) acknowledges the generally accepted principle 
that a person who is not capable in his individual capacity 
of committing an offense may nevertheless be liable for the 
behavior of another who has the capacity to commit that crime. 
Paragraph (C) recognizes that a person is nevertheless 
guilty of the commission of a crime even though the person he 
aids or solicits could not be convicted of the crime because 
of some legal disability such as youth or mental condition. 
The basis for such liability is discussed in the commentary 
accompanying§ 100(3). 
Subsection (b) provides for two exemptions to the 
general principles of§ 100. The first exemption, providing that 
the victim of an offense is not criminally liable as an 
accomplice appears in paragraph (1). 
It seems clear that the victim of a crime should 
not be held as an accomplice in its perpetration, though 
his conduct in a sense assists in the commission of the 
crime. The businessman who yields to the extortion of a 
racketeer, the parent who pays ransom to the kidnapper, 
may be unwise or even may be thought immoral; [but] to 
3.
view them as involved in the commission of the crime 
confounds the policy embodied in the prohibition; it is 
laid down, wholly or in part, for their protection. 
Model Penal Code§ 2.04(5), Comment. at 35 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1953) 
The second exemption requires the legislature to decide 
whether the conduct inevitably incidental to a crime should be 
made-criminal; for example, is the purchaser of sexual 
services guilty of prostitution? The Code does not prohibit 
the criminalization of such conduct; it merely provides that 
liability does not occur unless a statute specifically provides 
that it does. 
IV. Section 11.16.130. LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Section 130 describes the situations when an organization 
(defined in§ ll.81.900(b) (37)) is legally accountable for 
the conduct of its agent. Section 12.55.035(c) includes a 
separate schedule of fines that can be levied against an 
organization convicted of an offense. 
An organization is legally accountable for the conduct 
of its agent (defined in subsection (b)) constituting an 
offense under subsection (1) (A) when the agent is acting 
within the scope of his employment and in behalf or the organi­
zation. Subsection (1) (B) provides that the organization 
will also be liable for the conduct of its agent if it solicits 
the conduct or subsequently ratifies or adopts the conduct. 
Finally, an organization will be liable for its agent's 
conduct when the agent fails to discharge a specific duty 
imposed on the organization by law (i.e., filing corporate 
income tax). 
4.
CHAPTER 31. ATTEMPT AND SOLICITATION 
I. Section 11.31.100. ATTEMPT
To be guilty of a.n attempt to commit a crime a person
must act with an intent to commit a crime. Acting with the 
requisite intent, the defendant must engage in conduct that 
constitutes a "substantial step" toward the commission of 
the attempted crime. The "substantial step" language emphasizes 
that mere preparatory conduct is not sufficient to constitute 
an attempt. Alaska Criminal Code Revision, Tenative Draft, 
Part 2, Commentary at 73-74 (1977) includes guidelines from the 
Model Penal Code which further define the phrase "substantial 
step". 
Unlike existing law, the Code does not require as an 
element of the crime of attempt that the attempted crime fail. 
For example, the state may prosecute for the crime of attempted 
sexual assault in the first degree without being required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that penetration did not occur. 
See, § III, infra. 
The defenses of factual and legal impossibility are 
eliminated in subsection (b). The Alaska Supreme Court has 
already held that factual impossibility is not a defense to 
attempt, Gargan v. State, 436 P.2d 968 (Alaska 1968). In 
excluding the defense of legal impossibility the Code provides, 
for example, that a person who attempts to receive goods believing 
them to have been stolen is guilty of attempted theft even 
though the goods had not been stolen. 5.
Subsection (c) provides that a renunciation of criminal 
intent which succeeds in preventing the attempted crime is 
an affirmative defense (defined in § ll.81.900 (b) (1)) to 
attempt. The first element of defense, and probably the most 
difficult to prove, is that the renunciation must have been 
"voluntary and complete" (defined in § 11. 81.900 (b) (48)). 
The second element is that the defendant must have actually 
prevented the crime. If the "substantial step" toward the 
commission of the crime is itself a criminal act, the 
defendant can be prosecuted for that crime, but not for an 
attempt to commit the target crime. 
With four exceptions, the Code grades attempt one 
level below the substantive crime, e.g., �n attempt to commit 
a class A felony will be a class B felony. Attempted first or 
second degree murder or attempted kidnapping are classified 
as class A felonies while an attempt to commit a B misdemeanor 
is classified as a B misdemeanor. 
II. Section 11.31.110. SOLICITATION
To commit solicitation a person must act with the "intent
of causing another to engage in conduct constituting a crime". 
Acting with that intent, the person must solicit another person 
to engage in that conduct. "Solicit" is defined in § 11. 81. 900 
(b) (53) as including commands.
Similar to its treatment of attempt, the Code provides that 
renunciation is an affirmative defense to solicitation. The 
renunciation must be "voluntary and complete" and the defendant 
6.
must actually succeed in preventing the solicited crime. If 
the solicited crime is committed, the defendant may be charged 
with the substantive crime. See, § 11.16.110(2) (A). 
The Code provides the same punishment for solicitation as 
it does for attempt. While existing law generally punishes 
solicitation less severely than attempt, the Code reflects the 
judgment that solicitation often presents as much danger as an 
attempt and should be treated similarly for sentencing purposes. 
III. Section 11. 31.140. MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS BARRED
Subsection (a) is designed to permit prosecution for 
attempt or solicitation even if the target crime was completed. 
Although prosecution is allowed for both the preparatory and 
target crime, subsection (c) prohibits convictions of both 
crimes. As used in this statute "conviction" refers to 
the imposition of multiple sentences for the listed offenses 
and not the jury's return of multiple guilty verdicts. 
Subsection (b) precludes conviction of solicitation and 
attempt for conduct designed to culminate in the commission of 
the same target crime. The subsection reflects the policy of 
finding the evil of preparatory action in the danger that it 
may culminate in the substantive offense that is its object; 
there is no reason to cumulate convictions of attempt and soli­
citation to commit the same crime. 
Subsection (d) is included to emphasize that subsections 
(b) and (c) deal only with convictions and not with prosecutions.
IV. Section 11.31.150. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMES INVOLVING ATTEMPT
AND SOLICITATION 
This section provides that a defendant may not be charged 
7.
under § 11.31.100 or 110 if a statute defining an offense pro­
vides that an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense 
itself constitutes the substantive offense. For example, 
§ 11.46.260 provides that the crime of removal of identification
marks occurs when a person "attempts to deface • . . any 
serial number". A person who engages in this conduct must be 
charged with the substantive crime of removal of identification 
marks and not with attempt under § 11.31.110. 
8.
CHAPTER 41, ARTICLE 1. ROMICIDE 
I. Section 11.41.100. MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE
Under the Code a person commits murder in the first
degree when he intentionally causes the death of another 
person. The statute does not require that the defendant act 
with "deliberate and premeditated malice". Instead, the 
definition of "intentionally" (§11. 81. 900 (a) (1)) requires 
that he act with a conscious objective to cause death. 
Murder in the first degree also includes causing another 
to commit suicide through duress or deception. Conduct 
included in this category could include entering into a 
suicide pact with the intent not to go through with the act 
after the other person commits suicide. 
Defenses applicable to first degree murder are set out 
in §llS(a) and (d) and are discussed infra. 
Murder is an unclassified felony punishable by 20 - 99 
years imprisonment in § 12.55.125(a). 
II. Section 11.41.110. MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE
The crime of murder in the second degree, punishable by
5 - 99 years imprisonment in §12.55.125(b), is described in 
three subsections. 
Subsection (a)(l) covers conduct falling short of in­
tentional killings. A defendant is guilty of murder in the 
second degree under this subsection if acting with an intent 
to cause serious physical injury, or with knowledge that his 
conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious 
physical injury, he causes the death of another person. 
9.
Shooting into a crowded room without an intent to cause 
death or serious physical injury would be an example of an 
act done with knowledge that death or serious physical 
injury is substantially certain to result. 
Subsection (a) (2) describes conduct that is very similar 
to the "substantially certain" clause in subsection (a)(l). 
Under this provision, however, the defendant need not 
necessarily know that his conduct is substantially certain 
�· 
to cause death or serious physical injury. An example of 
conduct covered by this provision would be shooting through 
a tent under circumstances where the defendant did not know 
a person was inside or persuading a person to play "russian 
roulette". The defendant is only required to intend to 
perform the act; there is no requirement that he intend to 
cause death or that he know that his conduct is substantially 
certain to cause death. 
Subsection (a)(3) states the Code's felony-murder rule. 
Under the rule, a felon is guilty of murder in the second 
degree if any person causes the death of any nonparticipant 
during, in furtherance of, or in flight from one of the 
underlying felonies. The limitation to deaths of nonparticipants 
insures that a felon will not be liable for the death of his 
accomplice caused, for example, by a bank guard attempting 
to apprehend the felons. If a bystander is killed in crossfire 
between the felons and the guard, however, the felons will 
be guilty of felony-murder. 
10.
III. Section 11.41.115. DEFENSES TO MURDER
Subsection (a) codifies the "heat of passion" defense 
to murder. If the defense is successfully raised the defendant 
would still be guilty of manslaughter. See subsection (e). 
The term "serious provocation" is defined in subsection 
(f)(2) to preclude consideration of whe-ther the defendant 
was intoxicated in determining whether the provocation was 
sufficient to create an intense passion in a reasonable 
person. 
Subsection (b) provides a limited affirmative defense 
to the felony-murder rule. The defense is available if the 
defendant was unarmed, unaware that his co-felons, if any, 
were armed or intended to engage in conduct likely to result 
in death or serious physical injury, and did not commit, 
solicit, or aid in the commission of the homicidal act. 
Subsection (c) was referred to at Criminal Law Subcommission 
meetings as the "felony-murder merger doctrine". In considering 
this extremely limited exemption from the felony-murder 
rule, it must be recalled that the purpose of the rule is to 
diminish the risk of unintentional or even accidental killings 
during the commission of violent felonies. One of these 
felonies, burglary in the first degree, occurs when a person 
enters a dwelling with intent to commit a crime. If a person 
corrnnits burglary in the first degree by breaking into a 
house with intent to kill the occupant, the felony-murder 
rule would have no deterent effect. 
11.
Permitting a conviction for murder under the felony-murder 
rule in this circumstance would also have the effect of 
preventing the jury from considering whether the defendant 
acted in the ''heat of passion". 
The Code does not permit a conviction for felony-murder 
in this situation; the felony is said to "merge" with the 
homicide. Of course, the defendant can still be charged with 
first or second degree murder for the intentional killing. 
The effect of the felony-murder merger doctrine is to prohibit 
a second degree murder conviction solely on proof that the 
defendant comitted first degree burglary by entering a 
dwelling with intent to kill the occupant. 
Subsection (d) provides a defense to murder in the 
first degree and murder in the second degree under subsection 
(a)(l) if the defendant honestly, but unreasonably, believed 
circumstances to be such, that had they been as they believed 
them to be, he would have had a legal justification for the 
killing. For example, a person who intentionally causes 
death acting on a reasonable belief that such an action is 
necessary to defend himself from serious physical injury 
will not be guilty of murder or any other crime since he can 
establish the justification of self defense set forth in§ 
11.81.335. If, however, the trier of fact finds that the 
belief, though an honest one, was an unreasonable one, the 
defendant would have a defense to murder but could still be 
convicted of manslaughter. 
12.
IV. Section 11.41.120; 130. MANSLAUGHTER; CRIMINALLY
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
In the Code, manslaughter is defined as any intentional 
knowing or reckless killing not amounting to murder. Included 
in this category would be "heat of passion" killings, killings 
done under an unreasonable belief as to justification and 
all reckless killings. Additionally, the crime of manslaughter 
also specifically covers the situation when a person intentionally 
aids another to commit suicide. The crime of criminally 
negligent homicide covers all criminally negligent killings. 
Manslaughter is classified as a class A felony; criminally 
negligent homicide is a class C felony. 
The culpable mental states of recklessness and criminal 
negligence (defined in § ll.81.900(a)(3)&(4)) are similar in 
two respects. Both involve a "substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the result will occur" (in the case of a homicide, 
death) and both require a disregard of that risk constituting 
"a gross deviation from the standard" of conduct or care 
that "a reasonable person would observe in the situation." 
Recklessness, however, requires a "conscious disregard'' of 
that risk - the defendant must subjectively be aware of the 
risk. The criminally negligent defendant, on the other hand, 
is unaware of the risk and hence disregards it unconsciously. 
In one limited situation proof of recklessness need not 
depend on an actual awareness of risk: "a person who is 
unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he 
not been intoxicated acts recklessly with respect to that 
risk." § 11. 81. 900 (a) (3). 
13.
The defendant who consciously disregards a "substantial 
and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct will cause death is 
guilty of manslaughter under the Code if death results. The 
defendant who causes death but was unaware of the risk is 
guilty of criminally negligent homicide. By requiring that 
the defendant's conduct or care constitute a "gross deviation 
from the standard" of conduct or care that "a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation," the revised manslaughter 
and criminally negligent homicide statutes incorporate the 
existing rule that ordinary negligence cannot support a 
conviction for manslaughter. 
V. Section 11. 41.140. DEFINITION
To commit any form of homicide, the defendant must 
cause the death of a person. This section defines "person" 
as a human being who has been born and was alive at the time 
of the criminal act. Thus, abortions are excluded from the 
coverage of this article. The crime of abortion is defined 
in AS 11.15. 060, and that provision is not changed by the 
Code. 
The definition of "alive" is the converse of the definition 
of "death" appearing in existing AS 9. 65. 120. 
14.
CHAPTER 41, ARTICLE 2. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
I. Section 11.41.200. ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE
Assault in the first degree, a class A felony, is the
most serious form of assault in the Code. The crime may be 
committed by any of three methods. 
• The first, subsection (a) (1), coincides with existing
law by providing that an assault by means of a dangerous in­
strument is treated more severely than other forms of assault. 
The subsection requires that the defendant act with an intent 
to cause serious physical injury and that he cause physical 
injury to any person (of course, excluding himself) by means of a 
dangerous instrument. An attempt to cause such injury, as with 
other forms of assault, is covered under the Code's general 
attempt statute, § 11.31.100. The terms "dangerous instrument", 
"physical injury" and "serious physical injury" are defined in 
§ 11. 81. 900 (b).
Subsection (a) (2) describes conduct where the defendant, 
intending to cause serious physical injury, causes such injury 
by any means. The subsection coincides with the existing may­
hem statute. 
Subsection (a) (3) is particularly significant when con­
sidered in conjunction with § 11. 41.110 (a) (2) defining the same 
conduct as second degree murder when death results. The murder 
provision applies to conduct of extreme depravity, such as 
shooting a bullet through a tent without any specific homi­
cidal intent. Although this coduct will constitute manslaughter 
under current law in the event of a fatality, it does not cons­
titute assault if the result was serious but non-fatal injury. 
This obvious gap in existing law is closed by subsection (a) (3). 
15.
II. Section 11.41.210. ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE
Assault in the second degree is. a class B felony that may 
be accomplished by any of three methods. 
Subsection (a) (1) parallels subsection (a) (2) of the first 
degree statute. In committing second degree assault, however, 
the defendant need only act with an intent to cause physical 
injury. An intent to cause serious physical injury is required 
under the first degree provision. 
Subsection (a) (2) provides that intentionally placing anothc _ 
person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of 
a dangerous instrument is a serious felony offense. The sub­
section is an aggravated form of assault in the third degree 
under subsection (a) (3). Note that the definition of dangerous 
instrument includes loaded as well as unloaded firearms. 
Subsection (a) (3) covers the reckless causing of serious 
physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument. As an in­
toxicated person acts recklessly ( § 11. 81. 9 00 ( a) ( 3)) and be­
cause an automobile can be a dangerous instrument, (§ 11.81. 
900(b) (11)), it is expected that this subsection will pri­
marily be used to prosecute drunk drivers who seriously injure 
their victims. 
III. Section 11.41.230. ASSAULT IN THE THIRD DEGREE 
Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor. 
The three subsections of the statute require that the victim be 
threatened with physical injury or that he suffer physical 
injury. 
16.
Subsection (a} (1), by providing that intentionally or 
recklessly causing physical injury to another person constitutes 
misdemeanor assault, �arallels the existing assault and 
assault and battery statute, AS 11.15.230. 
Under subsection (a} (2) a person.commits assault in the 
third degree if he acts w.ith the culpable mental state of 
criminal negligence and causes physical injury to another person 
by means of a dangerous instrument. Un�ike existing 
AS 11.15.200 the statute is not limited to firearms but includes 
all dangerous instruments. 
Subsection (a} (3), the nonaggravated form of second 
degree assault under§ 210 (a) (2), provides that intention­
ally placing another in fear of immeneqt physical injury is 
a class A misdemeanor. 
IV. Section 11.41.250. RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT
If a person engages in reckless conduct and death re­
sults, he will be guilty of either murder in the second degree 
or manslaughter depending on the presence of "extreme in­
difference to the value of human life." If the person engages 
in the same conduct but no one is killed, b_ut someone is in­
jured, he will be guilty of some degree of assault. The crime 
of reckless endangerment covers the situation where the person 
acts with the same degree of recklessness as regards human life, 
but no one is injured. The person, for example, who shoots 
a bullet through a tent and fortunately does not kill or 
injure anyone could be charged with reckless endangerment. 
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CHAPTER 41, ARTICLE 3. KIDNAPPING AND CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE 
I. Section 11.41.300. KIDNAPPING
There are three methods of committing kidnapping under
the Code. Each requires that the defendant restrain his 
victim. "Restrain" is defined in sec. 11. 41.370(3). Restraint 
may be accomplished by moving a person or by confining him. 
The person's movements must be restricted unlawfully and 
without his consent. Paragraphs (A) and (B) of the definition 
describe when a restraint is "without consent". 
Kidnapping will occur when the defendant restrains his 
victim with one of the five intents specified in paragraphs 
(A) - (E) of subsection (a) (1). The intents describe the
most typical kidnapping situations. Note that there is no 
requirement that the intent actually be carried out. 
Paragraph (A) covers the intent to hold the victim for 
ransom, reward or other payment. The phrase "or other 
payment" would cover the situation where a child was taken 
from his parents to be sold to a "blackmarket'' adoption ring. 
Paragraph (D) refers to an intent to interfere with the 
performance of any governmental or political function. This 
would include, for example, kidnapping a legislator so that 
he would be unable to participate in an official debate. 
Paragraph (E) covers a restraint with intent to facilitate a 
felony. Movements that are merely incidental to the commission 
of another crime do not fall within this provision. 
Holding a person at gunpoint during a robbery, for example, 
will not be elevated to-kidnapping even though the person's 
movements are restricted. 
Kidnapping will also occur when a person is restrained 
under subsection (a)(2). Because it is impossible to list 
all the unlawful intents that may be involved in kidnapping 
under subsection (a)(l) and because proof of the defendant's 
intent may sometimes be impossible, paragraph (A) of subsection 
(a)(2) provides that restraining another person by secreting 
and holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found 
is kidnapping. 
Pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (a)(2), restraining 
another person under circumstances which expose him to a 
substantill risk of serious physical injury will also qualify 
as kidnapping. The primary application of this provision 
will be in situations where the victim is not secreted and it 
is impossible to estabiish whether the defendant's intent 
fell within subsection (a)(l). 
Subsection (b) provides that a relative (defined in §370(2)) 
has an affirmative defense to a charge of kidnapping under 
(a)(2)(A) if he restrians a child under 18 or an incompetent 
person with the primary intent to assume custody over him. 
The justification for preferential treatment accorded relatives 
is the view that relatives who take a child or incompetent 
person from their lawful custodian or acting in response to 
understandable, if misguided, domestic passion arid have a genuine 
interest or affection for the victim. Their conduct is 
neither as culpable as that of the 
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stranger who takes the child nor are they as likely to endanger 
the victim's welfare or sense of security as would the 
stranger. However, while the relative has not committed 
kidnapping under subsection (a) (2)(A), he could still be 
charged with custodial interference or kidnapping under 
subsection (a)(l) or (a)(2)(B). 
Subsection (c) provides that kidnapping is an unclassified 
felony punishable by a 5-99 year term of imprisonment in 
sec. 12. 55.125(b). However, the ofiense can be reduced to 
an A felony if the defendant successfully establishes the 
affirmative defense specified in subsection (d). 
Subsection (d) provides an affirmative defense (which 
the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence) 
to kidnapping. The successful raising of the defense will 
not free the defendant; it merely reduces the penalty for 
kidnapping. The defense is available if the defendant 
voluntarily releases the victim in a safe place before 
arrest, or within 24 hours after arrest, without having 
caused serious physical injury to him and without having 
sexually assaulted him. This affirmative defense should 
encourage the defendant to exercise care in the custody of a 
victim and to release the victim when doubts arise in the 
kidnapper's mind. 
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II. Section 11.41.320; 330. CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE IN
THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE 
While aimed primarily at eliminating kidnapping charges 
from child custody disputes, the statutes on custodial 
interence protect "parental custody against all unlawful 
interruption, even when the child itself is a willing, un­
deceived participant in the attack on this interest of its 
parent". Model Penal Code§ 212.4, Comments (Tent. Draft 
No. 11, 1960). 
The second degree crime, a class B misdemeanor, encompasses 
any interference with lawful custody rights by a relative 
acting with the intent to hold the victim for a protracted 
period. The defendant must know he has no legal right to 
interfere with the custody of the victim. The statute 
covers not only child custody situations, but also interference 
with children in state custody, incompetents or others who 
are entrusted by law to the custody of another person or 
institution. 
Custodial interference is aggravated to a C felony when 
the defendant removes the victim from the state. 
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CHAPTE R 4 1, ARTICLE 4. SEXUAL OFFENSES 
I. Section 11.41. 410. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE 
Sexual assault in the first degree is the most serious 
sexual offense in the Code and is classified as a class A 
felony. The statute prohibits four forms of conduct in-
volving sexual penetration or an attempt to engage in sexual 
penetration. As with the other sections of the article, the crime 
is "sex-neutral" . Sexual assault in the first degree can be 
committed by a male or female defendant with a male or female 
victim. The term "his" is used throughout the article for 
drafting convenience. 
Subsection (a) (1) prohibits sexual penetration without 
consent. The term "sexual penetration" is defined in 
§ ll. 81. 900(b) (52) to include genital and anal intercourse
as well as oral sexual acts. Additionally, any intrusion, 
however slight, of an object or any part of a persons body 
into the genital or anal opening of another person will con-
stitute sexual penetration. The definition does not require 
that the presence of semen be shown to establish that sexual 
penetration has occurred. Note also that each party to the 
acts defined as " sexual penetration" is considered to be 
engaged in sexual penetration. If the defendant, for example, 
forces his victim to perform fellatio, the defendant has 
engaged in sexual penetration with another person. 
The term " without consent" is defined in§ 1 1. 41. 470(3) 
in a manner to eliminate the need for proving resistance by the 
victim when he or she was coerced by the use of force against 
person or property or by one of the three specified threats. 
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Additionally, sexual penetration will be ' without consent" 
when the victim is incapacitated (defined in § 11. 41.470 (1)) 
as a result of an act of the defendant (i.e. , knock-out drug 
placed in drink). 
Subsection (a) (2) covers instances of sexual assaults 
involving attempts to engage in sexual penetration when the 
victim suffers serious physical injuLy. 
Subsection (a) (3) prohibits sexual penetration with a 
person under 13 regardless of whether the act was consensual. 
Sexual penetration with persons under 16 but over 13 is pro­
hibited in � ll.41. 440 (a) (1). 
Subsection (a) (4) provides that the final form of sexual 
assault in the first degree occurs when a person 18 or older 
engages in sexual penetration with a person under 18 who is 
entrusted to his care by authority of law (i. e. , ward) or who 
is his son or daughter. Insofar as the statute applies to 
a victim under 18 who is the defendant's son or daughter, it 
raises what would be a C felony under the incest statute, § 1 1. 
41. 450, to an A felony.
II. Section 11. 41. 420. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE 
The crime of sexual assault in the second degree provides 
that it is a B felony to coerce a person to engage in sexual 
contact by causing physical injury to anyone or by threatening 
anyone with imminent death, imminent physical injury or imminent 
kidnapping. If the victim was coerced to engage in sexual 
contact by such a threat or by the infliction of physical injury, 
it is immaterial whether resistance occurred. 
The term "sexual contact " is narrowly defined in § 11. 81. 
900 (b) (51) to cover specified types of intentional sexual touchings. 23.
The definition covers acts where the defendant touch�s the 
victim as well as acts where the defendant causes the victim 
to touch himself or the defendant. 
III. Section 11.41.430. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE THIRD DEGREE
This statute, a class C felony, prohibits sexual penetration
with two classes of persons that the legislature has determined 
require special protection under the law, regardless of whether 
the act occurs "without consent". If, however, the act occurs 
"without consent" of the victim, prosecution should be brought 
under § 11. 41. 410 (a) (1). 
Subsection (a) (1) prohibits sexual penetration with a person 
who is known by the defendant to be suffering from a mental 
disorder or defect which renders him incapable of appraising 
the nature of his conduct. To insure that the criminal law 
does not deny mentally incapacitated persons the right to have 
sexual relationships, the provision further requires that the 
conduct occur under circumstances in which a person who is 
capable of appraising the nature of the conduct would not have 
engaged in the sexual act. 
Subsection (a) (2) prohibits sexual penetration with 
a person who is known to be incapacitated. "Incapacitated" 
is defined in § ll.41.470(a) (1) as a person who is temporarily 
incapable of appraising the nature of his conduct and who 
.is physically unable to express unwillingness to act. Sexual 
penetration with an intoxicated person who has "passed out" would 
be covered by the section. If the sexual act occurs "without 
consent", prosecution should be brought under the more serious 
offense of sexual assault in the first degree, § 11. 41. 410 (a) (1). 
24.
IV. Section 11. 41. 440; 445 (b). SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR; 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFE NSE 
This provision, a class C felony, prohibits sexual 
penetration with children under 16 and sexual contact with 
children under 13. The crime occurs regardless of whether the 
child consented to the sexual act. 
Subsection (a) (1) applies to a person 16 or older who 
engages in sexual penetration with a person who is under 16 
but 13 or older. If the victim is under 13, prosecution 
should be brought under§ 410(a) (3). If the victim is under 
18 and the defendant's son or daughter or is entrusted to the 
defendant's care under authority of law, prosecution should be 
brought under§ 410 (a) (4). 
Sexual contact between a person 16 or older and a person 
under 13 is covered in subsection (a) (2). If the victim is 
under 16 but over 13, and the defendant is 19 or older, prosecution 
should be brought under the "contributing" statute, § 11. 51. 130 
(a) (4). 
In§ 445(b), the Code recognizes the limited affirmative de­
fense (which the defendant must establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence) of reasonable mistake as to age when liability 
for sexual assault or sexual abuse of a minor is dependent on 
that factor. The defense may only be raised when the victim 
is 13 or older at the time of the assault. If the victim is 
less than 13, the defendant will be strictly liable regardless 
of his belief as to the victim's age. 
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V. Section 11. 41. 445 (a). GENERAL PROVISIONS - "SPOUSAL 
IMMUNITY" 
Under existing law, a person can never be charged with the 
rape of his spouse. The Code substantially limits this immunity 
from prosecution by providing for the affirmative defense 
specified in § 445(a). A person charged with a sexual assault 
of his spouse under the Code will only be afforded a defense if 
the spouses were not living apart at the time of assault and if 
he did not cause physical injury to his spouse. 
injury to his spouse. 
VI. Section 11.41.450. INCEST 
This statute prohibits consensual acts of sexual penetration 
by a person 18 or older with a person who falls in one of the 
three classes of relationships listed in (a) (1)-(3). Incest is a 
class C felony. 
VII. Section 11.41.455. UNLAWFUL EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR 
Though this section is new to Alaska law, similar conduct 
has arguably been covered by the broad proscription of existing 
AS 11. 40 .130, which imposes felony penalties on one who "by 
threats, command or persuasion endeavors to induce a child 
under 18 to perform an act . . . which would manifestly tend 
to cause him to become or remain a delinquent." 
The statute can be violated by a person who induces or 
employs a child under 16 to engage in one of the six sexual acts 
specified in paragraphs (1)- (6) as well as by the person who 
photographs, films or televises such conduct. The defendant 
must act with the intent of producing a depiction of the act 
for a commercial purpose. 
Paragraphs (2), (3) and (6) require that the sexual act 
be "obscene." The Code does not define what is obscene but 
leaves such a determination for Alaska courts to decide. 
CHAPTER 41, ARTICLE 5. ROBBERY, EXTORTION, AND 
COERCION 
I. Section 11.41.500; 510. ROBBERY IN THE FIRST AND 
SECOND DEGREE 
Two degrees of robbery exist in. the Code. Robbery in 
the second degree contains the basic statement of the 
crime, with section 500 providing that certain aggravating 
factors will raise the crime to robbery in the first degree. 
The second degree provision will be used in prosecuting 
unarmed robberies. By referring to takings from the "immediate 
presence and control of a person" the statute is broad 
enough to cover takings directly from the person as well as 
takings which, though not from the person, pose identical 
dangers - i.e., the taking of a pocketbook placed on a park 
bench accomplished by threatening the owner who is sitting 
on the bench. 
Section 500 raises the crime to robbery in the first 
degree if at least one of three aggravating factors is 
present. First, a defendant commits first degree robbery if 
he is armed with a deadly weapon, regardless of whether the 
victim is aware that the defendant is so armed. 
Second, the robbery becomes first degree if the defendant 
represents by word or conduct that he or another participant 
is armed with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, even 
if nobody is so armed. This aggravating factor is present 
when a robber uses a note, a fake weapon or a "hand in 
pocket" technique to convey the impression that he is armed. 
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Third, the robbery is elevated to first degree if the 
defendant uses or attempts to use a dangerous instrument, or 
causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury. 
II. Section 11.41.520. EXTORTION 
The extortion statute in the Code is virtually identical 
to the statute passed by the legislature in 1974. The only 
changes that have been made were necessary to conform the 
statute to the Code's uniform general definitions (i.e. , in 
paragraph (1) the term "bodily injury" was changed to 
"physical injury"). 
Extortion is a B felony regardless of the value of the 
property that was obtained. In this regard, extortion 
differs from the theft provisions by not making the classification 
dependent on the value of the property. 
Under paragraph (1), extortion can be committed by 
obtaining property of another by threatening physical injury. 
It is important to note that while this conduct is similar 
to robbery, the extortion statute specifically excludes 
situations amounting to robbery from its coverage. Thus, if 
the threat is of immediate physical injury, the crime is 
robbery; if the threat involves other than the immediate 
infliction of physical injury, the crime is extortion. 
Extortion requires that the defendant actually obtain 
property by means of a threat. 
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If a threat is made and the victim does not comply with the 
demand, prosecution should be brought for attempted extortion, 
a class C felony under sec. 11.31.100. 
III. Section 11. 41.530. COERCION 
Coercion is classified as a C felony. Coercion of a 
person to do or abstain from any act when he has a legal 
right to do the opposite is prohibited. The crime of coercion 
describes conduct that is very similar to extortion. 
However, there is one primary distinction between the two 
crimes. Under extortion, the defendant must threaten 
his victim and obtain property. Under the crime of coercion, 
any act may be compelled by means of a threat. 
The type of threats that will be the basis of a charge 
of coercion are specified in paragraphs (1)-(6). These 
threats are identical to the threats listed in the same 
paragraphs of the extortion statute. One threat listed in 
the extortion statute is not, however, included in the 
coercion provision. Paragraph (7) of the extortion statute 
prohibits a threat to"inflict any other harm which would not 
benefit the person making the threat or suggestion". By 
not including this rather broad provision in the coercion 
statute, the code is consistent with the existing blackmail 
statute, AS 11.15.300, the current equivalent of the coercion 
statute, which defines the proscribed threats more narrowly 
than the extortion provision. 
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CHAPTER 46, ARTICLE 1. THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
I. Section 11. 46. 100. THEFT DEFINED 
The primary purpose of this article is the consolidation 
of the traditionally distinct crimes of larceny, larceny by 
trick, embezzlement, theft of mislaid property, obtaining 
property by false pretenses, receiving stolen property and 
theft of services into the crime of theft. "Theft" is 
defined in §100. The crime of theft is divided for purposes 
of punishment into four degrees in §130-150, depending 
primarily on the value of the property or services that was 
the subject of theft. The prohibited conduct is designated 
as "theft" to avoid any implication that the crime is limited 
by the scope of common law larceny. 
Subsection (1) describes conduct traditionally classified 
as larceny or embezzlement. The defendant must act with 
"intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate 
property of another". The terms "appropriate" and "deprive" 
are defined in §990 (1), (2). 
Subsections (2)-(6) refer to sections describing how 
theft of lost property, theft by deception, theft by receiving, 
theft of services, and theft by failure to make required 
disposition of funds received or held may be committed. It 
is important to note that the conduct described in these 
sections do not define separate crimes. Conduct described 
as theft by deception in §180, for example, is theft under 
§100, and depending on the value of the property involved 
will be punished as theft in the first, second, third, or 
fourth degree. 30. 
There is no separate offense of theft by deception in the 
Code. Se also, §ll0(a). 
To commit theft under paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (6) 
the defendant must "obtain" property of another. The 
definition of "obtain" in §900(5) extends the concept of 
taking to include constructive acquisition of property. 
Because asportation or "carrying away" of property is not an 
element of theft under the consolidated theft statute, theft 
of real property is possible under the Code, even though it 
was not included within the common law crime of larceny. 
The question of what can be the subject of larceny is 
resolved in existing law by an extensive, specific listing 
of various items which could not be the subject of larceny 
at common law. The Code simply prohibits theft of property 
or services. Property is defined broadly in §ll. 81.900(b)(44) 
as "an article, substance, or thing of value". If the 
subject of theft is a thing of value it will be covered by 
the Code regardless of whether it was included under the 
more restrictive common law definition of property. 
With regard to property subject to a security interest, 
the Code recognizes in §990(6) that possession of the 
property is the most important factor. A person in possession 
does not cormnit theft if he withholds prope.rty frotn a secured 
party. 31. 
The conduct, however, may be criminal under §730, defrauding 
creditors, Note also that in the absence of a specific agree­
ment to the contrary, a secured party commits theft if he 
repossesses property without the consent of the party in 
possession. 
II. Section 11. 46. 110. CONSOLIDATION OF THEFT OFFENSES: 
PLEADING AND PROOF 
Section 110 specifies the procedural consequences 
resulting from the consolidation of theft offenses. Under 
the Code a charge of theft is sufficient without designating 
the particular means by which the property or services was 
obtained. The section serves to underscore one of the chief 
aims of the article: elimination of the confusing distinctions 
among the most typical theft offenses. See generally, State 
�- Jim White, 508 P.2d 430 (Or. App. 1973) interpreting 
similar language in the Oregon consolidated theft statute. 
III. Sections 11. 46. 120-150; 990 THEFT IN THE FIRST, SECOND, 
THIRD, AND FOURTH DEGREE; . VALUE OF PROPERTY 
A. Section 11. 46. 120. Theft in the First Degree 
A person commits theft in the first degree, a class B 
felony, when he commits theft as described in §100 and the 
value of the property or service that is the subject of 
theft is $25, 000 or more. 
B. Section 11. 46. 130. Theft in the Second Degree 
Subsection (1) provides that theft in the first degree, 
a class C felony, is committed if a person commits theft as 
described in §100 and the value of the property or services 
that is the subject of theft is $500 or more. 
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Subsection (2) provides that the theft of any firearm 
·or explosive, regardless of value, is theft in the second 
degree. This provision is included because of the frequency 
with·which stolen firearms and explosives are used in committing 
other crimes. The terms "firearm" and "explosive" are 
defined in §ll. 46. 900(b). 
Subsection (3) provides that the theft of any property 
from the person is treated as second degree theft. This is 
consistent with existing AS 11. 15.250, larceny form a person, 
which treats non-forcible thefts from the person (i. e. , 
picking a pocket) as a felony, regardless of the value of 
the stolen property. Note, however, that if force is used 
the defendant has committed the more serious crime of robbery. 
C. Sections 11. 46. 140-150. Theft in the Third 
and Fourth Degree 
Theft of property or services worth between $50 and 
$500 or the theft of a credit card (defined in §11. 81. 990 
(b) (8)) is a class A misdemeanor, theft in the third degree. 
Theft in the fourth degree, a class B misdemeanor, is 
committed by _the theft of property or services worth less 
than $50. 
D. Section 11. 46.gso. Value of Property 
Because the degree of theft is primarily determined by 
the value of the property involved, the Code includes rules 
for determining value. While discussed in the context of 
the theft provisions, the rules specified in this section 
apply to all offenses in Chapter 46 in which it is necessary 
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to determine value. 
Subsection (a) provides that value will ordinarily mean 
the market value of the property at the time of the theft. 
If this cannot reasonably be ascertained, value means the 
cost of replacing the property. 
Subsection (b)(l) provides that the value of a written 
instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a 
check, draft, or promissory note, shall be considered the 
amount due or collectable on the instrument. Pursuant to 
subsection (b)(2), the value of, any other written instrument 
is considered the greatest amount of economic loss which the 
owner might reasonably suffer because of the theft. 
Subsection (c) provides that amounts involved in criminal 
acts committed under on course of conduct are to be aggregated 
in determining the degree of theft. 
(Subsection (c)) permits the cumulation of 
small amounts taken from the same or several 
persons pu�suant to one . . .  course of 
conduct . . . As an example of its appli­
cation, a bus driver or several bus drivers 
might pursue a scheme in which each day he 
or they would withhold not more than two 
or three dollars from the day's receipts. 
Or a transient operator might move from 
house to house in a neighborhood promising 
to seal roofs at $65 a roof, either abscond­
ing with the payment or dabbing at the 
roof with a few cents worth of tar. In 
either instance the employer, the householder 
and the community incur substantial financial 
loss. The . . .  course of conduct is 
calculated enough that it suggests a need for 
a substantial term or imprisonment or a 
period under probation. However, so long 
as each taking is considered a separate 
14. 
offense all the acts will be in the 
misdemeanor category only . . .  By 
aggregating the amounts, the defen­
dant may be brought into the felony 
range of punishments . . .  
Proposed Revision of the Michigan Criminal Code, at 222 
(Michigan State Bar 1967). 
IV. Section 11. 46.160. THEFT OF LOST OR MISLAID PROPERTY 
Pursuant to §100(2), a person commits theft if he 
commits conduct described in §160, theft of lost or mislaid 
property. 
The requirements of this statute are (1) the obtaining 
of property by the defendant (2) knowing it to have been 
lost, mislaid or delivered to him by mistake and (3) failing 
to take reasonable measures to restore the property to its 
owner (4) with intent to deprive the owner of the property. 
Subsection (b) specifically lists notification of a peace 
officer or the owner as a "reasonable measure" to restore 
property. 
V. Section 11. 46. 180. THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Section 180 provides that a person commits theft if, 
acting with the specified intent "he obtains property of 
another by deception." To insure that the criminal courts 
are not swamped with cases which should be treated as civil 
breach of contract claims, subsection (�) requires that the 
deception be established by more than a mere showing that 
the defendant's promise was not kept. 
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"Deception" is defined in §ll.46.900(b) (14) to cover 
five forms of conduct. Paragraph (A) codifies the traditional 
false pretenses concept of knowingly creating a false 
impression, but broadens its scope to include confirming 
another r s impression which the defendant does not believe to 
be true. The false impression may relate to law, value, 
intention or other state of mind. The traditional restriction 
to "existing facts" is rejected, as is the requirement of a 
"false token". 
If the defendant knowingly fails to correct a false 
impression which he has previously created he has committed 
deception under paragraph (B). Paragraph (C) provides that 
deception also occurs when a seller knowingly prevents a 
buyer from acquiring relevant information to the disposition 
of property or services. 
Paragraph (D) reaches the conduct currently covered by 
AS 11.20. 400 - conveying an interest in property and failing 
to disclose a claim which impairs the enjoyment of the 
property. 
Paragraph (E) provides that a person obtains property 
by deception if he promises performance which he intends or 
knows will not be performed. The original promise is actually 
the creating of a false impression under paragraph (A). 
However, it is adviseable to provide specifically for theft 
by a false promise to emphasize that the common law restriction 
to "existing facts" cannot be interpreted to exempt false 
promises from the coverage of the theft statute. 
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Section 180(c) provides that "deception" does not 
include falsity as to matters having no pencuniary significance, 
such as a false statement by a car salesman that he belongs 
to the Elks in order to sell a car to an enthusiastic Elk. 
The subsection also provides that "deception" does not 
include "puffing" by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary 
persons in the group addressed. An example of "puffing" 
would be a salesman's statement that ' this shampoo will make 
persons of the opposite sex fall all over you". 
It should also be noted in §11. 46. 985 the Code specifically 
rejects any possible defense that deception cannot occur 
unless a person was deceived. Frauds involving machines, 
ranging from inserting a slug into a parking meter to large 
scale computer frauds, will be covered under the consolidated 
theft statute. 
VI. Section 11.46. 190. THEFT BY RECEIVING 
The Code provision provides that a person commits theft 
if he "buys, receives, retains, conceals, or disposes of 
stolen property with reckless disregard that the property 
was stolen". The term "stolen property" is defined in 
§11.46.990(7). 
The statute does not require that the defendant "know" 
that the property was stolen; reckless disregard as to this 
element is sufficient. The definition of recklessly in 
§ll.81. 900(a)(3) would require the state to establish that 
the defendant was actually aware and consciously disregarded 37. 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the property was 
stolen. Further, the defendant's disregard of the risk that 
the property was stolen must constitute "a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would 
observe in the situation". Buying a new color television 
from a person in the street for $50 would be an example of 
conduct done with "reckless disregard" as to whether the 
property was stolen. 
VII. Section 11.46. 200. THEFT OF SERVICES 
The purpose of §11. 46 . 200 is to protect both individuals 
and commercial enterprises that supply services to the 
public from conduct not only partly covered by existing 
statutes. "Services" is defined broadly in § 11. 46. 900 (b) (50) 
to include all types of services mentioned in existing law 
but, in addition, specifically covers theft of labor and 
professional services. 
Subsection (a)(l) covers the obtaining of services by 
deception, force, threat or other means to avoid payment for 
the services. Enforceability is simplified by subsection 
(b), which provides that absconding without paying for 
hotel, restaurant or other similar services is prima facie 
evidence that the services were obtained by deception. 
Theft of services also occurs when a person improperly 
diverts services under his control to his or another's 
benefit. Paragraph (a)(2) would cover, for example, the 
foreman of a painting crew who has his subordinates paint 
his house on company time. 
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VIII. Section 11. 46. 210. THEFT BY FAILURE TO MAKE 
REQUIRED DISPOSITION OF FUNDS RECEIVED OR HELD 
It is questionable whether existing Alaska law covers 
the situation where a person receives property or services 
by promising to dispose of it in a certain way, exercises 
control over the property or services and fails to fulfill 
the obligation. The most typical examples are the employer 
who withholds amounts from his employees' pay for taxes, 
or the storekeeper who receives contributions for 
charity later to be transmitted by check to the ultimate 
charity recipient, and simply keeps the money. 
The conduct described by subsection (a) (l) is criminal 
only if the holder of the funds knows of his legal obligation 
to pay. Enforcement of this section is made easier by the 
prima facie evidence provision of subsection (c) that an 
employee or officer of the government or a financial institution 
or a fiduciary knows his relevant legal obligations. Such a 
person is also presumed to have dealt with the held funds as 
his own if he fails to account for the funds on lawful 
demand, or if an audit reveals a shortage or falsification 
of accounts. The terms "government'' and "fiduciary" are 
defined in sec. 11. 81. 990 (_b). The term "financial insti­
tution" is defined in sec. 11. 46.900(3). 
Subsection (b) provides an exception to the rule that 
39. 
requires stolen property to be specifically identified. A 
person who violates this section will not escape conviction 
simply because he has mingled the victim's money with his 
own funds. 
IX. Section 11. 46. 220;230. CONCEALMENT OF MERCHANDISE; 
REASONABLE DETENTION AS A DEFENSE 
Section 220 is derived from existing AS 11. 20. 275 but 
allows for felony prosecutions when over $500 in merchandise 
is involved. 
Section 230 is derived from existing AS 11.20. 277. It 
provides that a peace officer, or the owner of a store or 
his agent can detain a person when he has probable cause 
that the person has committed shoplifting. Note that the 
more clearly defined term "probable cause" has been substituted 
for the existing term "reasonable cause" in subsection. (a)(l). 
X. Section 11:46. 260-270. REMOVAL OF IDENTIFICATION 
MARKS: UNLAWFUL POSSESSION 
The crime of removal of identification marks prohibits 
the defacing, erasing or the altering of a serial number or 
identification mark "with intent to cause interruption to 
the ownership of another. " The intent element prevents 
conviction of persons who alter their own property. 
The crime of unlawful possession prohibits the possession 
of property "knowing that the serial number or identification 
mark . . .  has been erased, altered, changed or removed with 
the intent of causing interruption to ownership of another. " 
40. 
There should be few problems in convincing a jury that a 
person discovered, for example, with ten television sets in 
his basement, all with their serial numbers removed, possessed 
that property knowing it had been altered with the intent to 
cause interruption to the ownership of another. 
XI . .  section 11. 46. 280. ISSUING A BAD CHECK 
The crime of issuing a bad check is committed when a 
person issues (defined in subsection (c) (3)) a check (defined 
in subsection (c) (2)) knowing that it will not be honored 
by the drawee. The penalty for issuing a bad check parallels 
the general theft provisions and is based on the face value 
of the check. 
Under subsection (b), the state meets its initial 
burden of proving knowledge if it shows that the issuer of 
the bad check had no account with the drawee at the time 
the check was issued or that the drawee refused the check 
within 30 days of issue and the drawer of the check failed to 
make full satisfaction within 15 days after notice of dishonor 
was sent to him. 
XII. Sections 11. 46. 285-290. FRAUDULENT USE OF. A CREDIT 
CARD; OBTAINING A CREDIT CARD BY FRAUDULENT MEANS 
Obtaining property or services through the unauthorized 
use of a credit card is proscribed in 9285. Penalties for 
the prohibited conduct parallel those provided for theft. 
However, because it is highly unlikely that the fraud will 
involve $25, 000, B felony penalties are not provided. 
41. 
Note that amounts obtained pursuant to one course of conduct 
may be aggregated in determining the degree of the crime. 
See §III C, supra. 
The crime of obtaining a credit card by fradulent means 
specifies three forms o� unlawful acts involving credit 
cards. The penalty for the conduct described in subsection 
(a) ( 1) and ( 2) is a class C felony, while A misdemeanor 
penalties are provided for violation of subsection (a)(3). 
42. 
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CHAPTER 46, ARTICLE 2. BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
I. Sections 11. 46. 300-310. BURGLARY IN THE FIRST AND 
SECOND DEGREE 
The Code provides for two degrees of burglary; the 
first degree offense is a class B felony, the second degree 
offense is a class C felony. 
A person commits burglary in the second degree when he 
"enters or remains unlawfully" in a building with intent to 
commit a crime. The quoted phrase is defined in sec. 
11. 46. 350 (a) . The term "building" is defined in sec. 11. 81. 900 (b) ( 3) 
Note that the defendant is not required to form the intent 
to commit the crime at the time he enters the building. An 
initial lawful entry, followed by an unlawful remaining will 
be sufficient to establish this element. 
Burglary will be aggravated to a class B felony when 
one of four factors is present. First, any burglary of a 
dwelling will be first degree burglary. There is no requirement 
that the dwelling be occupied or that the conduct occur in 
the nighttime. "Dwelling" is defined in sec. ll. 81. 900(b)(l7) 
and would include hotel rooms as well as tents. 
Burglary of a building will also be burglary in the 
first degree if (1) the defendant is armed with a firearm 
(note, there is no requirement that the defendant use the 
firearm), (2) causes or attempts to cause physical injury, 43. 
or (3) uses or threatens to use a dangerous instrument. The 
terms "firearm", "physical injury", and "dangerous instrument" 
are defined in sec. 11. 46. 900 (b). 
II. Sections 11. 46.320-330. CRIMINAL TRESPASS IN THE FIRST 
AND SECOND DEGREE 
Similar to burglary, criminal trespass is divided into 
two degrees. The first degree offense is a class A mis­
demeanor, the second degree offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
Criminal trespass in the second degree occurs when a person 
"enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises. The 
term "premises" is defined in sec. ll. 46. 900 (b)(42) to mean 
real property including any building. Criminal trespass in 
the second degree also occurs when a person enters or 
remains unlawfully in a propelled vehicle. Note that the 
taking of a propelled vehicle would be prosecuted under the 
code provisions on theft or criminal mischief. Section 
ll.46. 330 (a) (2) covers relatively trivial conduct, such as 
unlawfully entering an automobile to take a nap. 
Criminal trespass in the first degree covers two forms 
of conduct. The first is entering or remaining upon real 
property with intent to commit a crime on the property. 
Ordinarily such conduct would be prosecuted under sec. 
330 (a) (1). However, proof that the defendant intended to 
commit a crime on the land during his trespass will aggravate 
the crime to a class A misdemeanor. 
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Criminal trespass in the first degree also occurs when a 
person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling. This 
conduct would be prosecuted as burglary in the first degree 
if it could be established that the person entered or remained 
unlawfully in the dwelling with intent to conrrnit a crime. 
The issue of whether land must be posted to sustain a 
conviction for trespass is addressed in sec. ll. 46. 350(b). 
Ordinarily, posting is required in a reasonably conspicious 
manner. However, if it can be established that the person 
·< 
entered onto the land with intent to conrrnit a crime (for 
example, to conrrnit theft of property on the land) it is not 
required that the land was posted. 
III. Section 11. 46. 350. DEFENSE: EMERGENCY USE OF PREMISES 
This affirmative defense is based on existing AS 11. 20. 135. 
One change should be noted. The existing provision requires 
that the person who used the premises in an emergency notify 
the owner or the police of such entry within 15 days after 
using the facility. This requirement ignores the practicalities 
of providing such timely notice in a remote bush area as 
well as providing too much le.eway in the event of a trespass 
near a population center. In place of the rigid 15 day 
requirement, the Code requires that notice be given "as soon 
as reasonably practical after the entry". 45. 
CHAPTER 46, ARTICLE 3. ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, AND 
RELATED OFFENSES 
I. Sections 11. 46. 400-430. ARSON IN THE FIRST AND SECOND 
DEGREE, CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT BURNING 
The most serious arson offense in the Code is arson in 
the first degree, a class A felony. To commit the crime a 
person must intentionally damage any property by fire or 
explosion. As a result of that act, another person must be 
placed in danger of serious physical injury. Note that 
while the defendant must intend to damage any property, (his 
own or another's) , there is no requirement that he intend to 
place another person in danger. Recklessness as to this 
result is sufficient. Note also that there is no requirement 
that a person actually suffer serious physical injury. 
Merely placing a person in danger of serious physical 
injury will be sufficient. 
Arson in the second degree, a class B felony, 
covers the damaging of any building by fire or explosion. A 
number of distinctions should be noted between this provision 
and the first degree statute. Under the second degree 
provision the property that is damaged must be a building, 
while under the first degree provision any property can be 
damaged. However, while the first degree provision requires 
that a person be placed in danger of injury, a similar 
re-quirement does not exist under the second degree statute. 
46. 
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An affirmative defense to arson in the second degr.2e is 
provided in subsection (b). The defense recognizes that 
in some instances the most economical method of removing a 
building is to burn it. Such conduct is exempted from the 
coverage of the statute if the defendant establishes that 
no other person had an interest in the property, or if they 
did, that they consented to the burning, and that the 
burning was for a lawful purpose. Burning a building to 
defraud an insurance company would not be a burning for a 
lawful purpose. Note that a similar defense does not apply 
to the first degree statute. If the burning recklessly 
olaces another person in danger of serious physical injury, 
the defendant has cormnitted first degree arson even if he 
acted for a lawful purpose. 
The crime of criminally negligent burning, a class A 
misdemeanor, covers the criminally negligent damaging of the 
property of another by fire or explosion. The person who 
falls asleep in a hotel bed with a cigarette in his hand, 
for example, would violate the statute if the bed caught on 
fire. If physical injury or death results, prosecution 
would be brought under the Code's homicide or assault statutes. 
II. Section 11.46. 450. FAILURE TO CONTROL DR REPORT A 
DANGEROUS FIRE 
Existing AS 41.15.llO(a) creates an affirmative duty 
on a person to exercise due care to prevent the uncontrolled 
spread of a fire when he knows of a fire or sets a fire on 
forest lands, owned, possessed or controlled by him. 
47. 
The Code provision broadens existing law by providing 
that the failure to control or report a dangerous fire is in 
some circumstances a criminal offense, regardless of whether 
it occurs on forest lands. The crime may be committed by 
two classes of persons. 
Subsection (a) (l) recognizes that a person " under 
an official, contractual or other legal duty to prevent or 
combat the fire" commits the crime if, knowing that the fire 
is dangerous, he either fails to take reasonable measures to 
control the fire or fails to give a prompt fire alarm. 
Subsection (a) (2) places the same duty on any person, 
not just one who is under a duty to act, when the fire was 
started by him or with his assent, or if the fire was started 
on property in his custody. 
III. Section 11. 46. 480-486. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF IN THE 
FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH DEGREE 
A. Section 11. 46. 480 Criminal Mischief in the 
First Degree 
The most aggravated form of criminal mischief, a class 
B felony, can be committed· by any of three methods. Subsection -
(a) (1) would apply to conduct such as the destruction of a 
power line or the placing of sugar in the gas tanks of an 
ambulande fleet when substantial interruption or impairment 
of the service results. 
48. 
Subsection (a)(2) covers the person who acting with 
an intent to damage property, damages property of another 
in an amount exceeding $100, 000 by the use of "widely 
dangerous means. " Note that only an intent to damage property 
by the use of widely dangerous means is required. The 
defendant is not required to intend $100, 000 in damage. The 
definition of "widely dangerous means" in §490 (4) insures 
that the statute is only applicable when a person employs a 
difficult to confine force such as an avalanche, radioactive 
material, or flood to cause substantial property damage. 
The likelihood of serious physical injury resulting from 
the use of a "widely dangerous means" to intentionally cause 
damage to property justifies classification of this conduct 
as more serious than other forms of property damage. 
Subsection (3) parallels existing AS ll.20.517 (a), enacted 
during the 1977 legislative session. 
B. Section 11.46. 482. Criminal Mischief in the 
Second Degree 
Criminal mischief in the second degree, a class C felony, 
may be connnitted in four ways. The first, described in 
subsection (a) (l), occurs when a person intentionally damages 
property of another and causes damage in an amount of 
$500 or more. 
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Subsection (a) (2) parallels the coverage of existing AS 
ll.20.517(b) which, like AS ll. 20. 517(a), was enacted during
the 1977 legislative ses.sion. One change should be noted. 
The statute covers the act of tampering with an airplane or 
l}elicopter with reckless disregard for the ri.sk of harm _to the 
property. The possibility that such conduct will result in 
serious physical injury or death ne.cessitates felony penalties
for such an improper interference. 
Subsection (_a) (3) prohibits conduct similar to that 
described in subsection(a)(2) of the first degree statute. 
The second degree offense, however, does not require that 
the defendant actually damage property of another; reckless 
creation of a risk of damage in excess of $100, 000 to property 
of another by the use of a widely dangerous means is made 
punishable by subsection (a) (3). The culpable mental state 
of "recklessly, " defined in §ll. 81. 900(a)(3), requires that 
the person be "aware of and consciously disregard a substan­
tial and unjustifiable risk that" the damage will occur. 
Neither ordinary negligence nor criminally negligent behavior 
are sufficient to constitute a violation of the statute. 
Subsection (a)(4) covers aggravated instances of "joyridinP.; 11
in which the propelled vehicle suffers $500 or more in damages 
the owner incurs reasonable expenses of $500 or more as a 
consequence of his loss of the use of the vehicle (i. e., car 
rentals). The term "propelled vehicle" is defined in AS 
ll. 81. 900(b)(43).
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If it can be established that the defendant acted with an 
intent to deprive the owner of the vehicle or to appropriate 
the vehicle to himself, prosecution should be brought under 
the Code's consolidated theft statute. 
C. Section 11.46.484. Criminal Mischief in the 
Third Degree 
Criminal mischief in the third degree, a class A mis-
demeanor, can be corrnnitted three ways. The first, subsection 
(a)(l), is similar to the same subsection of the second de�ree 
offense. To be guilty of the third degree offense, however, 
the damage need only exceed $50. The second degree offense 
requires at least $500 damage. 
Subsection (a)(2) is the non-aggravated form of 11joyridingu 
under sec. 482(a) (4). 
Subsection (a)(3) criminalizes "unreasonable deviationsu 
from the terms of a rental agreement for the use of a propelled 
vehicle. Renting a car in Anchorage and agreeing to return it 
the next day could be the basis of a prosecution under the 
statute if the car was found in a parking lot in Fairbanks two 
months later. 
D. Section 11.46.486. Criminal Mischief in the 
Fourth Degree 
Criminal mischief in the fourth degree, a class B 
misdemeanor, covers the person who merely utampersu (defined 
in §490(2)) with property. The defendant must act with 
either a reckt�,ss disregard for the risk of harm to the 
. ·.:), 
property or with an intent to cause substantial inconvenience 
to another. 
51. 
Subsection (a)(2) provides that the intentional damaging 
of property of another in an amount less than $50 is criminal 
mischief in the fourth degree. The statute is broad enough 
to cover such acts as the destruction of posted signs as 
well as the defacing of property. 
Subsection (a)(3) covers the conduct of a person who 
knowingly rides in a stolen automobile or an automobile that 
is being used in violation of secs. 482(a)(4) or 494(a)(2) of 
the criminal mischief provisions. If it can be established 
that the rider acted with an intent to facilitate the connnission 
of the underlying offense and in fact aided in the connnission 
of the offense, the rider should be prosecuted as an accomplice 
to the theft or the criminal mischief. 
IV. Section 11.46.688. LITTERING 
This offense provides a $300 fine for littering. Since no 
culpable mental state is specified, the offense is one of 
strict liability. (sec. ll.81.600(b)(l)(A). 
52. 
CHAPTER 46. ARTICLE 4. FORGERY & RELATED OFFENSES 
I. Sections 11.46.500-510. FORGERY IN THE FIRST, SECOND 
AND THIRD DEGREE 
The crime of forgery is divided into three degrees. 
Forgery in the first degree is a class B felony, forgery 
in the second degree is a class C felony, and forgery in 
the third degree is a class A misdemeanor. The three 
statutes cover all the different methods of creating, 
possessing and passing forged written instruments. 
Any "written instrument" may be the subject of forgery. 
The definition in§ ll.46.580(b) (3) is broad enough to 
cover all instruments which traditionally have been the 
subject of forgery, as well as such recent innovations as 
microfilm, electronic tape and computerized records. The 
effect of the definition is to restore the common law 
principle that forgery can be committed with respect to 
any writing as well as its modern day equivalents which 
can be used as the means of defrauding another. 
To commit forgery, the defendant must act with the 
culpable mental state of "intent to defraud". Section 
11.46.990(4) defines "intent to defraud" as "an intent 
to injure someone's interest which has value, or an intent 
to use deception." The term "deception" is discussed 
in the commentary accompanying the theft by deception statute, 
§ 11.46.180. Paragraph (B) of the definition makes it clear 
that a forger commits an offense even though he does not 
defraud the person to whom he sells or passes the forged 
instrument as long as he knows that he is facilitating an 
eventual fraud, i.e., selling forged stock certificates 
that are represented to be forged, to a third person who 
will pass them as genuine. 
Forgery may be cornrnited by any of three methods. 
Section 510(a) (1) provides that forgery occurs when a 
person falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument. 
The terms "falsely alter", "falsely complete" and "falsely 
make" are defined in§ 580(a) . Forgery also occurs when 
a person knowingly possesses or utters a forged instrument. 
"Utter" is defined in § 580 (b) (2) to include all the various 
methods of making use of the instrument prescrived by 
existing law. 
Forgery will be a felony when the written instrument 
falls into one of the four categories described in paragraphs 
(1) -(2) of§ 500 or§ 505. The forging of these instruments 
merit felony classification since the conduct will usually 
be preliminary to a large scale fraud. 
II. Section 11.46.520. CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A FORGERY 
DEVICE 
This statute reaches back to a point before actual forgery 
commences to penalize those who posses either (1) devices 
with little or no use other than forgery, or (2) other devices 
that can be adapted and are intended to be adapted for use in 
committing forgery. The prohibition applies to devices for 
forging any written instrument. Both subsections of the 
statute require that the defendant act with an intent to use 
the device or to aid another to use the device for purposes 
of forgery. 
54. 
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III. Section 11.46.530. CRIMINAL SIMULATION 
The primary application of this statute is directed at 
fraudulent misrepresentation of antique or rare objects such 
as paintings or other objects of art, antiques, books, 
manuscripts, and archeological artifacts. While a completed 
transaction will amount to theft, this provision allows 
intervention at a time even prior to the attempted passing 
of the simulated article. The penalty for this offense is 
based on the value of what the object purports to represent. 
IV. Section 11.46.540. OBTAINING A SIGNATURE BY D ECEPTION 
This section provides that a person commits a class A 
misdemeanor if he "causes another to sign or execute a written 
instrument by deception" such as a letter of recommendation to 
a prospective employer or a will. To fall within this 
section, the signature must be obtained "with intent to 
defraud". The terms "deception" and "intent to defraud" 
are defined in§ ll.81.900(b) (14) and§ 11.46.990(4). 
This section is necessary because the obtaining of the 
signature by deception will not always be covered by other 
sections of the Code. The conduct is not forgery because 
the resulting docuernnt is not a "forged written instrument". 
The document is precisely what is purports to be - it just 
would not have been created without the defendant's deception. 
The conduct is also not theft because a signature is not 
"property". 
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V. Section 11.46.550. OFFERING A FALSE INSTRUMENT FOR 
RECORDING 
The Code punishes the filing of a forged instrument in 
the public records just as it does any other uttering of a 
forged written instrument - as forgery. This section, a 
class C felony, is necessary_to cover the filing of a written 
instrument, done with an intent to defraud, knowing that it 
contains false statements or information. 
The coverage of this statute is limited to written 
instruments "relating to or affecting real or personal 
property or directly affecting a contractual relationship" 
because the files containing these documents are consulted 
and relied upon by the general public. 
VI. Section 11.41.570. CRIMINAL IMPERSONATION 
A defendant who assumes a false identity or falsely 
claims to represent someone else commits criminal imper­
sonation when he does an act in that character with intent 
to defraud. 
This statute, a class A misdemeanor, can be used to 
arrest a professional con man as soon as he is discovered 
to be a fake, without having to take the risk of waiting 
for him to make substantial progress in his scheme. 
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CHAPTER 46, ARTICLE 5. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL OFFENSES 
I. Section 11.46.600. SCHEME TO DEFRAUD 
The crime of scheme to defraud provides class B felony 
penalties for frauds involving five or more victims or 
a scheme to obtain $10, 000 or more from one or more persons. 
It is not an element of the crime that a specific dollar loss 
was suffered by a victim of the scheme. The defendant, 
however, must obtain property or services from at least one 
of his victims in accordance with the scheme. Note that there 
is no requirement that all the property or services that is the 
target of scheme be obtained. The obtaining of any property or 
services will satisfy paragraph {2) . 
Subsections {a) {A) and (B) of the statute are based on 
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) and the revised versions of that pro­
vision appearing in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code§ 1437 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1734 (1977) . The federal provision 
is commonly referred to as the mail fraud statute. 
A substantial body of case law has developed around the 
mail fraud statute making it an effective tool in the area 
of large scale consumer frauds. Because the language of the 
proposed statute in part parrallels that of the mail fraud 
statute, it is expected that the judicial decisions under the 
federal provision will be highly relevant in the construction of 
the Code provision. As noted in the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., Report to Accompany 
S. l, Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, 699 (Comm. Print 
1976) , the cases prosecuted under the mail fraud statute have 
in part established the following principles: 
57. 
A. The phrase "scheme and artifice to defraud" 
is to be broadly interpreted; for example, it has been 
·held to reach a scheme calculated to deceive persons 
of ordinary prudence and comprehension even though no 
misrepresentation-is made. 
B. Any scheme which involves elements of trickery 
or deceit is within the mail fraud statute. 
C. A scheme to defraud may be shown by statements 
of half truths or the conc�alment of material fact, as 
well as by affirmative misrepresentation. 
D. One who acts with reckless indifference as to 
whether a representation is true or false is as liable 
as if he had actual knowledge of the falsity. 
E. The success or failure of the scheme is im­
material, and it is not necessary to show that any 
person was in fact defrauded. 
F. A scheme to defraud encompasses false repre­
sentations as to future intentions, as well as existing 
facts. 
G. A promoter's sincere belief in the ultimate 
success of his enterprise will not excuse false repre­
sentations. 
H. The mail fraud statute was intended to protect 
the gullible, the ignorant and the over-credulous as 
well as the more skeptical. The "monumental credulity 
of the victim is no shield for the accused. " 
I. Proof of reliance on the false representation 
is not necessary. 
II. Section 11.46. 620. MISAPPLICATION OF PROPERTY 
The Code provision applies to two classes of persons: 
( 1) those who hold property as a "fiduciary", a term defined 
in§ ll.81.900 (b) (20) , and (2) those who have access to property 
belonging to the government (defined in§ ll.81. 900 (b) (23) ) 
or a financial institution (defined in§ 11.46. 990 (3) ) .  
The culpability element requires knowledge that the actor is 
misapplying property. Subsection (c) describes conduct that 
constitutes misapplication. The potential defense that 
it may be impossible to identify the particular property 
involved due to commingling is specifically eliminated in 
subsection (b) . 
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The statute does not require that the misapplication 
involve a risk of loss or detriment to the owner. Any knowing 
misapplication will result in the imposition of criminal 
penalties. 
Misapplication of property is classified as a class 
A misdemeanor. This sanction is sufficient to deter persons 
from wrongfully dealing with property when they have no 
intent to deprive the owner of it. If such an intent can 
be established, the defendant may be prosecuted for theft . • 
III. Section 11.46.630. FALSIFYING BUSINESS RECORDS 
The crime of falsifying business records, a class C felony, 
is directed at conduct preliminary to the commission of fraud. 
As an element of the offense the state must establish that the 
defendant acted with an "intent to defraud". The term "intent 
to defraud" is defined in § 11.46.990(4). Acting with that 
intent the defendant must make a false entry in, or omit, remove 
or prevent the making of a true entry in the business records 
of an enterprise. The crime is also committed when the de­
fendant causes the omission of a true entry or causes the 
making of a false entry in business records. 
IV. Section 11.46.660-670. COMMERCIAL BRIBE RECEIVING; 
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 
Though the crimes of commercial bribe receiving and 
commercial bribery are new to existing law, similar provisions 
appear in a significant number of recently revised codes. 
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Through the last century, most states attempted 
to regulate the behavior of unscrupulous public officials 
through laws that defined bribery and extortion of 
public officials as a criminal offense. In the last 
few years, however, states have begun to recognize 
that bribery in the private sector can also be a major 
threat -- one that can undermine a competitive economic 
system. As a result some thirty states have moved to 
specifically prohibit commercial bribery. 
The dangers of ignoring commercial bribery are 
quite clear. Gifts of endless variety are traded to 
influence an employee to improperly carry out a respon­
sibility entrusted to him by an individual or corpora­
tion. But when bribery successfully gives a firm an 
unfair advantage over competitors, other businesses 
may be forced to do the same in order to survive. 
The States Combat White Collar Crime, National Conference of 
State Legislatures at 10 (1976). 
Commercial bribe receiving, a class C felony, covers 
commercial bribe solicitors and receivers. The crime occurs 
when a person solicits, accepts or agrees to accept a benefit 
with intent to violate a duty to which he is subject as one 
of the five general classes of persons described in sub­
sections (a) (1) (A)- (E). 
The five general classes are defined broadly to cover 
all areas where a duty of fidelity is owed. 
The nature and scope of such duties are defined by 
common and statutory law regulating or creating the 
various legal relationships involved. Thus, for ex­
ample, the duty of an employee to an employer may 
be not to give away trade secrets, whereas the duty 
of a fiduciary to his beneficiary or a union repre­
sentative of an employee's welfare fund to employees 
may be to exercise independent judgment. 
HAW. REV. STAT. 6 708-88-, Commentary at 227 (Special Pamph­
let 1975) . 
Commercial bribery, is also a class C felony. The 
crime covers the person who offers or gives a bribe and parallels 
the Code's general bribery statute, § 11.56.100. 
V. Section 11.46. 710. DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 
The Code provision describes five forms of deceptive 
business practices and classifies the prohibited conduct as 
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a class A misdemeanor. Since �o culpal?ility is specified, 
the prosecution must establish that the defendant acted 
knowingly as to his conduct and recklessly as to the result 
of his conduct and to circumstnaces surrounding the conduct. 
See§ ll.81.610(b) . Mere civil negligence, or even criminal 
negligence, will not be suffieient to establish a violation 
of the statute. As under the existing Unfair Trade Practices 
Act, AS 45.50.471-561, the prohibited forms of deceptive business 
practices require that the defendant commit the prohibited 
act while "in the course of engaging in a business, occupation 
or profession." 
Subsection (a) (1) prohibits the making of a false statement 
in any advertisement or communication to a substantial number of 
persons. "False statement" is defined in subsection (b) ( 2) to 
mean conduct commonly referred to as "bait advertising." 
Subsection (a) (2) prohibits a person from using or 
possessing a false weight or measure for falsely determining 
or recording any measurement of quality or quantity. Sub­
section (a) (3) prohibits a person from selling, offering 
for sale or delivering less than the represented quantity of 
a commodity or service. 
Subsections (a) (4) and (a) (5) prohibit a person 
from selling, offering for sale or exposing for sale adul­
terated or mislabeled commodities. The terms "adulterate" 
and "mislabeled" are defined in§§ 710(b) (l) and (3) . Note 
that the determination of whether a commodity is "adulterated" 
or "mislabeled" is based, for the most part, on existing 
statutes and regulations. Thi.:.�: the statute operates as a 
"piggy-back" provision on existing law; it does not determine 
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what is adulterated or mislabeled, it merely punishes the 
sale of such commodities. 
The Code repeals the criminal penalties now provided 
for violation of the consumer protection act. In doing 
so, it is not the intention of the legislature to narrow 
the. coverage of the consumer protection act, but rather to 
provide that violations of the act should be dealt with 
civilly. 
VI. Section 11.46. 720. MISREPRESENTATION OF USE OF A PRO-
PELLED VEHICLE 
The Code provision on misrepresentantion of use of 
a propelled vehicle provides that it is a class A misdemeanor 
to sell or lease a propelled vehicle with intent to deceive 
and with knowledge that the usage registering device on the 
veh icle has been disconnected, adjusted or replaced to mis­
represent the miles traveled by the vehicle or the hours 
of engine use. As defined in subsection (b) , "usage 
registering devices" would include recording tachometers, 
hobbsmeters and similar instruments as well as devices 
commonly associated only with automobiles such as speedo­
meters and odometers. The effect of this definition is 
to extend the coverage of the statute to airplanes, 
construction equipment and other propelled vehicles the 
use of which is measured by hours of operation rather 
than miles travelled. 
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VII. Section l'l.46.7:30. DEFMU,DING CREDITORS 
This section proscribes conduct that defrauds secured 
creditors, judgment creditors and creditors of an#insolvent. 
The classification of the crime is based on whether the creditor 
incurs a loss as a result of the defendant's conduct. If the 
defendant merely hampers enforcent'ent of the creditor's interest, 
the conduct is an A misdemeanor. If the creditor suffers a loss, 
the classification is dependent on the amount of loss suffered 
by the creditor. 
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CHAPTER 51. OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY 
I. Section 11.51.100; 120. ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A 
MINOR; CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT 
In revi€wing the statutes that follow, it must be remembered 
that the Code's assault and homicide provisions provide compre­
hensive coverage of conduct involving physical abuse of children. 
The statutes in this chapter merely supplement that coverage. 
If the child suffered serious physical injury or was assaulted 
by means of a dangerous instrument, prosecution should be 
brought under the general assault statutes, or in the ex-
treme case, under the homicide provisions. 
A. Endangering the Welfare of a Minor 
The crime of endangering the welfare of a minor, a 
class C felony, is committed when a person legally charged 
with the care or custody of a child under 10 years of age 
intentionally deserts the child under circumstances creating a 
substantial risk of physical injury. 
Use of the term "deserts" requires that the defendant 
act with an intent to permanently sever his relationship with 
the child rather than to merely create a temporary physical 
separation. The Code provision would not cover the parent who, 
for example, left a child in the custody of a relative for 
two days even though the parent had agreed to return in four 
hours. 
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B. Criminal Nonsupport 
The nonsupport statute, a class A misdemeanor, is based 
on existing AS 11.35.010. Several changes from existing law 
should be noted. 
The Code provision only applies to the support of children; 
it does not apply to support of spouses. The increased 
availability of legal services and the variety of civil 
remedies available to deserted spouses makes continued 
criminal sanctions in this area. 
The Code provision raises the age of the child from 
16, as it appears in AS 11. 35.010, to 18. This change 
takes into account the longer period of time during which 
children are expected to remain in school and dependent on 
their parents. 
Like the existing statute, the Code provision makes 
liability dependent on the absence of a "lawful excuse. " 
Thus, a defendant may not be convicted under the statute for 
failure to provide support to his minor child if he is in 
fact financially unable to provide support and his poverty is 
not self-induced. See Johansen v. State, 491 P. 2d 759 
(Alaska 1971). The term "support" is defined in subsection 
(b) and is derived from existing AS 11.35. 0lO (b). 
II. Section 11.51.125. FAILURE TO PERMIT VISITATION WITH 
A MINOR 
Because existing AS 11.36. 010 was adopted by the legis­
lature less than a year ago, it has been included in the Code 
virtually unchanged. The Code provision does, however, 
use the term "intentionally " instead of "wilfully " to describe 
the culpable mental state requirement. Since the only punish-
65. 
• 
ment provided by AS 11.36.010 is a fine, the Code classifies 
the conduct as a violation, a noncriminal offense punishable 
by a fine not to exceed $300. 
III. Section 11.51.130. CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY 
OF A MINOR 
The Code provision on "contributing" provides that 
a person commits a class A misdemeanor if he engages in 
one of four forms of prohibited conduct. To be charged with 
the crime the defendant must have been 19 or older at the 
time he engaged in the prohibited conduct. A minor is unable 
to contribute to the delinquency of a minor under the Code. 
Subsection (a) applies to the person who "aids, 
causes, or encourages a child under 18 years of age to do any 
act in fact prohibited by state law." This conduct would 
not generally be punishable under the complicity provisions 
of the Code unless the defendant acted with an intent to 
"promote or facilitate the commission of the offense" and, 
in fact, solicited commission of the offense or aided or 
abetted in the planning or commission of the offense. 
Since no culpability is specified regarding defendant's 
knowledge of the age of the minor, it must be established that 
he acted at least recklessly as to this element. (§ ll.81.610(b)). 
Subsection (b) provides that a person commits "contri­
buting" if he induces, causes, or permits a child under 18 
to participate in unlawful gambling. Subsection (c) extends the 
coverage of the statute to a person who knowingly permits a 
minor to enter or remain in a building where the unlawful sale 
of a drug occurs. The term "drug" is defined in § 11. 81. 900 (b) ( ll) 
and is supplemented by the definitions in § 900(b) (4) and (6). 
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"Contributing" also occurs when a person engages in sexual 
contact with a person under 16 but 13 or older. If the child 
is under 13, or if the sexual act occurs without consent, 
prosecution should be brought under the sexual assault pro­
visions of the Code which provide felony penalties for 
such conduct. (§ 11.41.420, 440 (a) (2)) . 
V. Section 11.51.140. UNLAWFUL MARRYING 
The Code substantially restates the existing polygamy 
statute, AS 11.40.050, but makes several minor changes in 
the law. The name of the crime has been changed to "unlaw­
ful marrying" since both the Code and existing law prohibit 
what is commonly thought of as bigamy as well as polygamy. 
The Code provision also reflects the modern view that 
bigamy should not be treated as a strict liability offense. 
Thus, the Code imposes class A misdemeanor penalties only if 
it is established that the defendant acted knowingly as to 
each of the elements set out in the statute, i.e., he must 
know that either he or his prospective spouse is already law­
fully married to another or that either he or the prospective 
spouse is marrying more than one person simultaneously. Note 
that unlike existing AS 11.40.050, the Code imposes liability 
on both parties to the bigamous marriage, irrespective of 
which of them is already married, so long as they act knowingly. 
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CHAPTER 56, ARTICLE 1. BRIBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
I. DEFINITIONS OF " BENEFIT" AND "PUBLIC SERVANT" 
Key to the article are the definitions of two terms -
" benefit" and "public servant." 
A. Section 11.56.130. BENEFIT 
" Benefit" is defined in § 11. 81. 9 90 (b) ( 2) as "a present 
or future gain or advantage to the beneficiary or to a third 
person pursuant to the desire of consent of the beneficiary." 
When first considered by the Criminal Law Revision Subcornrnission, 
the term "benefit" was qualified by the word "pecuniary". 
The definition of "pecuniary benefit" required that the benefit 
have a primary significance of economic gain. This definition 
was considered unduly restrictive since not all benefits are 
economic (i.e., favorable action by college admissions 
officer in processing application of public servant's son). 
In using the broad term " benefit" the bribery statutes 
insure coverage in all appropriate cases. However, benefits 
which serve only to provide a "climate for discussion" with 
a public servant (i.e. , picking up a dinner tab or golfing 
fee) are beyond the scope of the statutes because the granting 
of the " benefit" is not in itself intended or expected to influence 
an official decision. The giving and receiving of such in­
significant benefits, though not covered by the Code, is, 
however, an appropriate topic to be addressed in conflict of 
interest statutes and ethical conduct regulations and standards. 
Insofar as they are reported in accordance with AS 15.13 
(State Elections Campaigns), political campaign contributions 
have been specifically excluded from the definition of "bene-
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fit". This qualification is intended to make it clear that 
legitimate, reported political campaign contributions, though 
made with an intent to advance a political viewpoint, afe not 
to be punished as bribery. Also required to be excluded from 
the broad definition of "benefit" for purposes of the .bribery 
statutes are instances of "logrolling" and election support 
(i.e., volunteer campaign �ork) solicited by a public servant 
or offered by any person in an election. If, however, the support 
consists of a campaign contribution, the contribution must be 
reported in accordance with AS 15.13 for it to be excluded 
from the coverage of the definition of "benefit". 
B. Section ll.81.900(b) (47). PUBLIC SERVANT 
The term "public servant" is defined broadly to include 
not only every category of government or public officer, but 
every employee of every such office or agency, every person 
retained to perform some government service and every person 
who, though not having yet assumed his official duties, has 
been selected to become a public servant. 
The definition has been drafted to make it clear that 
those serving "political subdivisions" and "governmental 
instrumentalities" within the state are public servants. 
Coverage is also intended to reach persons who serve govern­
mental instrumentalities and political subdivisions of the state 
in advisory or consultative capacities. 
The words "whether compensated or not" have been added 
to insure that the bribery statutes cover individuals who are 
serving in a compensatory position as well as those serving 
without pay. The gist of the offense is the intent to in­
fluence the course of public administration. The public 
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servant functioning gratuitously can be as effective 
in corrupting governmental process as the paid functionary. 
Witnesses and jurors are excluded from the definition. 
Bribery and bribe receiving of and by such persons is covered 
in Article 4 of the Chapter. 
II. Section 11.56.100; 110. BRIBERY; RECEIVING A BRIBE 
The Code makes only minor changes in existing law. The 
crime of bribe receiving has been broadened to include soli­
citation of bribes by public servants, conduct not now pro­
hibited by the existing statute. The statutes do not use the 
word "corruptly", but prohibit without qualification the giving 
or receiving of any benefit with intent to influence official 
decision-making. 
The bribery statute penalizes offers made with the intent 
to influence a public servant. No meeting of the minds is re­
quired before the offerer of a bribe may be prosecuted. 
The recipient, however, must have either solicited the bribe 
or have accepted it, or agreed to accept it, upon an agreement 
or understanding with the offerer before the public servant 
has committed bribe receiving. 
Subsection lOO (b} contains a further application of the 
doctrine of impossibility which is discussed in the commentary 
accompanying the attempt statute. 
I I I. Section 11.56. 130. RECEIVING UNLAWFUL GRATUTIES 
The bribery statutes cover all cases of reward for im­
proper conduct on the part of a public servant. The crime of 
receiving unlawful gratuities covers all cases of improper re­
ward for conduct which the public servant was required or 
authorized to perform. 
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Note that the statute prohibits solicitations of bene­
fits by public servants without regard to the value of the 
benefit. However, when the public servant accepts a benefit, 
without soliciting it, the benefit must have a value of $50 
or more for the crime to have occured. This limitation is 
intended to insure that public servants will not be subject 
to criminal prosecution for accepting such minor items as 
a box of candy on Christmas when the public servant did not 
accept the benefit upon an understanding that his actions would, 
as a public servant, be influenced. 
It must be emphasized that the Judiciary Committees 
do not approve the practice of public servants accepting tips. 
However, the Committees concluded that regulation of 
such activity is more properly left to personnel regulations 
and ethical guidelines rather than to the criminal law. 
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CHAPTER 56, ARTICLE 2. PERJURY AND RELATED OFFENSES 
I. Section 11. 56.240. DEFINITIONS 
"Statement" is defined in subsection (1) to mean any 
representation of fact, including a statement of opinion 
or belief when the opinion or belief relates to a state of mind. 
Thus, the statement "I believe the tar wa� red" is a false state­
ment only if the defendant did not have the stated belief; its 
falsity does not depend on the actual color of the car. 
A "sworn statement" is defined in subsection (2) as 
a statement given under oath or affirmation, including a 
notarized statement, as well as a statement made under penalty 
of perjury pursuant to AS 09. 65.012. 
II. Section 11.56. 200. PERJURY 
Perjury requires the making of a false sworn statement 
which the defendant does not believe to be true. Consistent 
with existing law, it is not required that the statement 
be material to the proceeding. 
Subsection (b) (1) recognizes that it is no defense to 
perjury that the testimony was subject to objection and 
should not have been received while subsection (b) (2) codifies 
the generally accepted rule that irregularity in the admin­
istration of the oath is not a defense. 
Perjury is classified as a class B felony. This classi­
fication is consistent with existing law which provides that 
most forms of perjury carry a 10 year maximum penalty. 
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III. Section 11.56.210.· UNSWORN FALSIFICATION 
The purpose of section 210 is to eliminate the need 
for numerous statutes outside Title 11 covering unsworn falsi­
fications and to replace them with one provision applicable to 
all unsworn falsifications. As its title indicates, the crime 
does not require that the false statement be made under oath. 
The statute offers a major advantage over existing 
law: it fills loopholes that result when the Legislature 
authorizes a form of economic grant or special license, 
but fails to enact a companion provision punishing falsi­
fication of the written or recorded application for such 
benefits. 
The elements of unsworn falsification under sub-
section (a) (1) are: (1) an intent to mislead a public 
servant in the performance of his duty, (2) an application 
for any benefit, containing (3) a false written or recorded 
statement (4) which the person does not believe to be true. 
Unsworn falsification may also be committed pursuant 
to subsection (a) (2) by making a false statement on a form 
which bears a notice, authorized by law, that false statements 
made therein are criminal. 
IV. Section 11.56.220. PROOF OF GUILT 
The Code does not require corroboration in a perjury 
prosecution. While there is currently no statute mandating 
that a perjury prosecution is subject to special rules 
of proof, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that a perjury 
conviction cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony of 
a single witness. Nelson v. State, 546 P.2d 592 (Alaska 1976) . 
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In the Code, perjury and unsworn falsification are 
no exception to the rule that guilt must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The number of witnesses as well as the 
corroborating evidence in support of the witnesses becomes 
simply one of several factors that a jury may take into 
consideration in arriving at a verdict. 
V. Section ll.56.230. PERJURY BY INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
The crime of perjury requires that the defendant make 
a false statement. Substantial problems of proof may arise 
when a defendant has made two statements under oath that are 
irreconcilably inconsistent to the degree that one of them 
is necessarily false, but the prosecution is unable to prove 
which statement was false. 
As an example, consider the case where Jones testifies 
at a preliminary hearing that Brown came to his office and 
attempted to extort money from him. At the subsequent trial, 
Jones testifies that he has never met Brown, that Brown never 
came to his office and that no one attempted to extort money 
from him. If there is no other way to prove whether Brown 
came to Jones' office to extort money, other than by the testi­
mony of Jones, the state may not be able to convict Jones of 
perjury even though Jones' two statements are irreconcilable 
to the degree that one of them is necessarily false. 
Section 230 creates the separate offense of perjury by 
inconsistent statements. Under the statute, the prosecution 
cannot simply rely on the introduction of the irreconcilable 
statements; it must also establish that the defendant did not 
believe one of the statements to be true at the time the 
statement was made. 
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This section is restricted to inconsistent statements 
made in Alaska within the period of the statute of limitations. 
The first limitation is designed to prevent a person 
from being indirectly punished for an old offense. The 
purpose of the second restriction is based on the rule that 
Alaska courts can only punish for crimes committed in Alaska. 
The problems that otherwise arise can best be saown by the 
following hypothetical: assume that Jones testified 
as a witness in a trial in Oregon, then subsequently 
appeared before an Alaska court and testified in a manner 
inconsistent with his Oregon testimony. If the Alaska testi­
mony was false, Jones committed perjury in Alaska, but if 
the Alaska testimony was true, no crime was committed in 
Alaska. Without the second limitation, if it were shown that 
the Oregon statement was false, Jones would stand convicted 
in Alaska for having committed a crime in Oregon and for having 
testified truthfully in Alaska. To avoid this result the 
statute requires that both inconsistent statements be made 
in Alaska. 
VI. Section 11.56.235 .. RETRACTION AS A DEFENSE 
The Code provides that it is an affirmative defense 
to a prosecution for perjury or unsworn falsification that 
the defendant expressly retracted his false statement. 
The reason for this section is that it is desirable to provide 
an incentive for the person to correct his misstatement and 
tell the truth. 
If the defendant committed perjury during an official 
proceeding (�efined in§ ll.81.900(b) (35)) retraction must 
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have occurred during the same proceeding, before discovery 
of the falsification became known to the defendant, before 
reliance upon the false statement, and, if the official pro­
ceeding involved a trier of fact, before the subject matter 
of the proceeding was submitted to the trier of fact. Thus, 
a false statement made by a witness during a trial could 
usually be retracted prior to the case being submitted to the 
jury. On the other hand, if a false statement is made to a 
magistrate to obtain a search warrant, retraction would not 
be a defense once the magistrate relied on the statement 
and issued the warrant. 
The requirements for a retraction involving a false 
sworn statement not made in an official proceeding (i.e., 
under penalty of perjury) or a retraction involving false 
unsworn statements are specified in subsections (b) and (c). 
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CHAPTER 56, ARTICLE 3. ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES 
I. Section 11.56.300 - 350. ESCAPE; UNLAWFUL EVASION 
During the 1976 legislative session, the escape statute 
was substantially amended and the new crime of unlawful evasion 
was adopted. Escape, AS 11.30.090, was divided into three 
degrees. Unlawful evasion, AS 11.30.093, was divided into two 
degrees. Punishment for escape was set at imprisonment for 
from 3 months (AS ll.20.095 (c)) to 5 years (AS ll.30.095 (a) ) .  
Punishment for unlawful evasion was set at imprisonment for 
a minimum of 30 days (AS ll. 30.095 (e) ) to a maximum of one 
year. The existing statute also includes provisions governing 
the "suspensions of imposition or execution of sentence or 
granting of parole" for persons convicted of escape or unlawful 
evasion. AS ll. 30.095 (f) - (i) . 
The Code makes three significant changes in existing law. 
The changes are summarized below: 
1. The Code provides that the most serious form of escape, 
a class A felony, occurs when a person removes 
himself from official detention by means of a 
deadly weapon. The term "official detention" is 
defined in§ ll.81.900 (b) (34) . The definition 
is not intended to cover placement of a juvenile 
in a foster home pursuant to a temporary custody 
order. 
2. The Code classifies all escapes from correctional 
facilities (defined in§ ll.81.900 (b) (7)) as escape 
in the second degree, a B felony. Existing law 
differentiates between an escapee who has committed 
a felony and one who has committed a misdemeanor; 
an escape by a misdemeanant from a correctional 
facility is classified as a misdemeanor. The danger 
to society resulting from correctional facility 
escapes is substantial, regardless of whether the 
escapee is a felon or misdemeanant. Note, however, 
that the Code continues to distinguish between other 
escapes from official detention (e.g., escape from 
custody of a peace officer) based on the class of 
offense committed by the escapee. 
3. The crime of escape in the third degree, a class 
C felony, covers escapes "during any lawful movement 
or activity incident to confinement within a correc­
tional facility on a charge of a misdemeanor." 
Conduct of this nature would include an escape from 
a courtroom by a convicted misdemeanant prior to 
being transported to a correctional facility. 
II. Section 11.56.370. PERMITTING AN ESCAPE 
The Code retains the coverage of existing AS 11.30.120 
but broadens it beyond the peace officer to cover the actions 
of "any public servant who is authorized and required by law 
to have charge of any person charged with or convicted of any 
crime." Such a person commits the crime of permitting an escape 
if "with criminal negligence he permits a person under 
official detention to escape.'' The potential danger resulting 
from such escapes justifies the imposition of criminal liability 
based on criminally negligent behavior. The offense is classi­
fied as a class C felony. 
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III. Section 11.56.389; 390. PROMOTING CONTRABAND IN THE FIRST 
AND SECOND DEGREE 
The crime of promoting contraband is divided into two 
degrees depending on the type of contraband that is involved. 
The term contraband is defined in § 11.56.390. If the contraband 
is a deadly weapon (defined in § ll.8l.900(b) (12)), an article 
that is intended by the defendant to be used as a means of 
facilitating an escape (i.e., a pass key), or a controlled 
substance (defined in § ll.81.900(b) (6)) promoting contraband 
in the first degree, a class C felony, has occured. If the 
prohibited article does not fall in one of these three 
categories, the crime is promoting contraband in the second 
degree, a class A misdemeanor. 
Note that the crimes can be committed by either the person 
who brings the contraband into the facility (§ 380(a) (1)) or the 
person confined in the facility (§380(a) (2)). Use of the 
culpability term "knows" in § 3 80 ( a) ( 2) and its absence in 
(a) (1) indicates that the person who brings the contraband 
into the facility is not required to know that the item is 
contraband. Recklessness is sufficient as to that element 
(§ ll.81.610(b) (2)). Such recklessness could be established 
by the nature of the item (i.e., firearm) or by the posting 
by correctional officials of a list of contraband items near 
the entrance of the facility. 
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CHAPTER 56, ARTICLE 4. OFFENSES RELATING TO JUDICIAL AND 
OTHER PROCEEDINGS 
I. Sections 11.56.510; 520. INTERFERENCE WITH OFFICIAL PRO­
CEEDINGS; RECEIVING A BRIBE BY A WITNESS OR JUROR 
The crime of interference with official proceedings, 
a class B felony, prohibits the subversion of official pro­
ceedings through the use of force against, or bribery of, 
witnesses and jurors. "Official proceeding" is defined in 
§ ll.81.900(b) (35) as a proceeding " heard before a legislative 
judicial, administrative or other governmental body or official 
authorized to hear evidence under oath". The terms "juror" 
and "witness" are defined in§ 11.56.900(3) and (6). 
"Witness" is defined to include not only persons summoned 
or appearing in an official proceeding but also persons whom 
the " defendant believes may be called as a witness in an 
official proceeding, present or future." This definition avoids 
confusion as to when an individual actually becomes a witness 
and emphasizes that the harm in the conduct prohibited in this 
article is the attempt to interfere with the course of an 
official proceeding. Note that the " defendant" referred to 
in the definition of " witness" is the person charged with a 
violation of chapter 56; not the defendant in a criminal case. 
Interference with official proceedings occurs pursuant to 
subsection (1) when a person uses force on anyone, damages 
the property of anyone or threatens anyone with one of the 
intents specified in paragraphs (A)-(D). The terms "force" 
and "threat" are defined in§ ll.81.900(b). 
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Paragraph (A) refers to an intent to "improperly in­
fluence a witness." Conduct which qualifies as improperly 
influencing a witness is defined in§ 11.56.900(1). Note 
that under paragraph (A) any attempt to influence the testi­
mony of a witness by one of the methods described in subsection 
(a) (1) is prohibited. Beating up a witness to make him testify 
truthfully is as criminal as beating him up with intent to make 
his testify falsely. Subsection (D), referring to "otherwise 
affect the outcome of an official proceeding" would include 
offering a bribe to a witness with intent to cause a mistrial. 
Subsection (2) prohibits bribery of a witness or juror. 
This provision is similar to the Code's general bribery statute. 
Similar to the Code's general bribe receiving statute, the 
crime of receiving a bribe by a witness or juror provides B 
felony penalties for the witness or juror who solicits a 
benefit, or accepts or agrees to accept a benefit upon an agree­
ment or understanding that he will be improperly influenced as 
a witness or that his decision as a juror will be influenced. 
II. Sections 11.56.540; 590. TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS; 
JURY TAMPERING 
The crime of tampering with a witness differs in three primary 
respects from the crime of interference with official pro­
ceedings. First, the means by which tampering with a witness 
is committed (inducing or attempting to induce) are not as 
.culpable or as overt as the means specified in the crime of 
interference with official proceedings (force, threat or bribery). 
Tampering with a witness is consequently graded as a class 
A misdemeanor. 
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Second, unlike the interference statute, an attempt to 
induce a prospective witness to avoid process is not made an 
offense. This distinction is discussed in the Commentary 
to the Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code § 5020 at 414. 
[W]hile [§ 11.56.510] make[s] it unlawful to
use a bribe or threat to induce a witness to avoid
legal process, [§ 11.56.540] does not bar an
attempt to achieve that objective by persuasion or
argument. A defense attorney, for example, would
not be prohibited from attempting by persuasion or
pleading to induce a witness to avoid process by
leaving the state. Although the attorney's activity 
might raise certain ethical issues, it should not 
give ise to criminal liability, since neither the 
means used nor the objective sought is unlawful 
in itself. 
Finally, while interference with official proceedings 
includes acts done with intent to induce a witness to " with­
hold testimony", tampering with a witness requires an intent 
to induce a witness to "unlawfully with hold testimony." 
While it would not be tampering with a witness to persuade a 
witness to lawfully refuse to testify on grounds of personal 
privilege, i.e., privilege against self-incrimination, it 
would be interference with official proceedings to attempt to 
do so by force, threat or bribe. 
The crime of jury tampering differs in only one respect 
from the crime of interference with official proceedings. The 
means by which tampering with a juror is committed (communicat­
ing with intent to influence) are less culpable than the means 
specified in the crime of interference with official proceedings. 
Tampering with a juror is consequently only graded as a class 
C felony. 
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III. Section ll.56.600. MISCONDUCT BY A JUROR
The crime of misconduct by a juror is similar to the
crime of receiving a bribe by a juror in that both require 
that the juror improperly agree to be influenced as a juror. 
However, unlike the crime of receiving a bribe by a juror, the 
crime of misconduct by a juror does not require that the juror 
agree to be influenced as a consequence of the acceptance of a 
benefit. Mere agreements to vote for a party in the official 
proceeding or to otherwise influence the official proceeding 
are proscribed in this section, a class C felony. 
IV. Section 11.56.610. TAMPERING WITH PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
This provision prohibits tampering with "physical evidence",
a term defined in § 11.56.900(4) to mean any "article, object, 
document, record or other thing of physical substance." 
Proceedings protected include both criminal investigations and 
official proceedings. 
Paragraph (1) is directed at the intentional destruction, 
mutilation, alteration, concealment or removal of physical evi­
dence with intent to impair its verity or availability in a criminal 
investigation or official proceeding. Paragraph (2) prohibits 
making, presenting or using evidence known to be false in an 
effort to mislead jurors or public servants engaged in official 
proceedings or criminal investigations. Paragraph (3) prohibits 
the use of force, deception� or threats to prevent the production 
of physical evidence in official proceedings and criminal 
investigations. In paragraph (4)� the statute criminalizes 
conduct identical to that proscribed by paragraphs (1)-(3) 
but engaged in with the intent to prevent the institution of 
an offical proceeding. 
V. Section 11.56.620. SIMULATING LEGAL PROCESS
This section is designed to protect the legitimacy
of governmental administration and prevent the impairment 
of public confidence in genuine documents. Subsection (a) (1) 
covers the person who, in attempting to collect a debt, 
issues a form that falsely simulates legal process. Sub­
section (a) (2) expands the coverage of subsection (a) (1) in 
nondebt situations to cover simulation of process of any 
court or official body, including those of other jurisdictions. 
Statutory authority of state agencies and other official bodies 
to issue subpoenas or other legal process is specifically 
recognized by subsection (a) (2). 
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CHAPTER 56, ARTICLE 5. OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
I. Section 11.56.700. RESISTING OR INTERFERING WITH ARREST
The crime of resisting or interfering with arrest, 
a class A.misdemeanor, prohibits a person from resisting the 
arrest of himself or interfering with the arrest of another by 
any of three methods. The person must know that a peace officer 
is making an arrest and act with the intent of preventing 
the officer from making the arrest. 
Subsection (a) (1) prohibits resisting or interfering 
with an arrest by the use of force. "Force II is defined in 
§ ll.81.900 (b) (23) to include any bodily impact as well as
threats of such impact. The issue of whether force may be used 
to resist an unlawful arrest is addressed in § 11.81.400. 
A person also violates the statute by committing 
any degree of criminal mischief (i.e., tampering with the 
officer's squad car) or by doing any act that creates 
a "substantial risk of physical injury'' (i.e., fleeing in an 
automobile at high speeds through a residential area). Mere 
non-submission to an arrest does not reach the level of resisting 
or interfering with arrest. 
II. Section 11.56.720. REFUSING TO ASSIST A PEACE OFFICER
OR JUDICIAL O�FICER 
The Code provides that it is a violation to unreasonably 
fail to make a good faith effort to physically assist 
a peace officer or judicial cfficer (defined in § 11.56.900 (2)) 
in the exercise of his official duties. The limitation to 
"physical" assistance is intended to exclude from the coverage 
of the statute mere refusals to provide information to an 
officer. 
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The statute requires that the citizen know that the person 
requesting assistance is a peace officer or judicial officer. 
Further, the citizen must unreasonably refuse to assist. 
The statute does not authorize peace officers or judicial 
officers to foist unreasonably dangerous duties upon citizens. 
Neither does it authorize them to command citizens to aid them 
in the performance of their every day duties. 
Subsection (b) extends the "good samaritan" protections of 
AS 09. 65.090 to situations where a citizen physically aids 
a peace officer pursuant to subsection (a). 
III. Section 11.56.770; 780. HINDERING PROSECUTION IN THE
FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE
Conduct which would give rise to liability as an accessory 
after the fact under existing law is classified as the crime 
of hindering prosecution under the Code. The degree of the 
crime is geared to the class of crime committed by the 
fugitive. 
To commit either degree of hindering prosecution, the 
defendant must act with an "intent to hinder the apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction or punishment" of a person or to assist 
a person "in profiting or benefiting from the commission of the 
crime". The first degree offense, a class C felony, requires that 
a felon be aided. The defendant is not required to know 
that the crime committed by the person he aided was a 
felony. Strict liability is applied to this element. 
The second degree offense expands existing law by prohibiting 
acts of rendering assistance to persons who have committed 
misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment for more than 90 days. 
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Unlike existing law, the Code establishes the precise 
acts needed to commit either degree of hindering prosecution. 
The six metqods described in § 770(b) (1) -(6) present a narrower 
concept of aid than in common law. This difference is discussed 
in the Commentary to the Model Penal Code at§ 208.32, Commentary 
at 198-200 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). 
IV. Section 11.56.790. COMPOUNDING
The common law offense of compounding prohibited agreements 
for consideration to refrain from giving information to law 
enforcement authorities concerning a crime. Under the exist­
ing statute, AS 11.30.190, only the person who receives the 
consideration commits compounding; the person who gives the 
consideration does not. 
The Code expands existing law by providing that both the 
receiver and the giver of the consideration commit compound­
ing, a class A misdemeanor. Both parties are viewed as being 
equally culpable and are punished identically. The Code de­
scribes the prohibited consideration as a "benefit", a term 
defined in§ ll.81.990(b) (2). The benefit ciust be offered 
or accepted in consideration for concealing the offense, 
refraining from initiating or aiding in the prosecution of the 
offense or withholding evidence of the offense . . 
Note that the statute specifically recognizes that exist­
ing law allows compromise of actions in certain situations. 
If the offer or acceptance of th� benefit is made pursuant to 
these statutes, the participants have not committed compounding. 
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V. Section 11.56.800; 810. MAKING A FALSE REPORT, TERRORISTIC 
THREATENING
The crime of making a false report is a class A misdemeanor. 
The statute covers three types of false reports. Subsection 
(a) (1) covers giving false information to a peace officer which
the defendant knows to be false, with intent to implicate 
another in a crime. Note that false reports to peace 
officers made with an intent to hinder the apprehension, prose­
cution, conviction or punishment of another are prohibited in 
the two degrees of hindering prosecution, discussed supra. 
Subsection (a) (2) prohibits false reports to peace 
officers that a crime has occurred or is about to occur. 
Such conduct is subject to criminal penalties because of the 
likelihood that substantial amounts of law enforcement 
resources will be misapplied in investigating the report. 
Subsection ( a) ( 3) extends beyond the present "false alarms" 
statute in its application to fictitious reports of "incidents 
calling for an emergency response'' rather than solely false 
reports to firefighters or ambulance operators. This assures 
coverage of reports concerning matters that may not be 
crimes in themselves, but are nevertheless within a 
proper area of investigation. 
The crime of terroristic threatening, a class C felony, 
describes three aggravated forms of making a false report. The 
defendant must knowingly make a false report that a circumstance 
dangerous to human life exists or is about to exist. As a re­
sult of the false report, one of the three results described in 
paragraphs (1)-(3) must occur. 88.
VI. Section 11.56.820. TAMPERING WITH PUBLIC RECORDS 
The crime of tampering with public records, a class A mis­
demeanor, penalizes conduct which undermines confidence 
in the accuracy of public records. The central purpose of 
the statute is not the protection of potential victims 
of altered public records. Consequently, the statute 
does not require that the tampering be made with an intent 
to defraud as do the sections on forgery and falsification 
of business records. Further, there is no requirement that the 
information in the public record be made under oath or 
sworn to, as required by the sections on perjury. The offenses 
of forgery and perjury do, however, complement the crime 
of tampering with public records when the aggravating 
circumstances are present. 
Key to the statute is the definition of "public record" 
appearing in § ll.81.900 (b) (46) . Two categories of conduct are 
prohibited. Subsection (a) (1) covers false entries or the false 
altering of a public record. Subsection (a) (2) covers the proble1,, 
of access to public records. Included in this category are acts 
of destruction and mutilation as well as the suppression or con­
cealment of a public record. This subsection is broad enough 
to cover the situation where a public servant prevents access 
to public records. 
Both subsections require that the defendant act knowingly. 
Under subsection (a) (1) he must know he is making a false 
entry or alteration. Under subsection (a) (2) he must destroy, 
mutilate or conceal documents, knowing that he has no legal 
authority to do so. 
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VII. Section 11.56. 830. IMPERSONATING A PUBLIC SERVANT 
The Code provision, a class B misdemeanor, prohibits the 
impersonation of any public servant. The defendant must 
pretend to be a public servant and must do an act in that 
capacity. 
The existing requirement that the impersonator require 
another to aid or assist him is not retained in the Code. 
Thus, the Code insures coverage in situations where no speci­
fic aid is requested, but the defendant has acted improperly. 
For example, a person who falsely pretends to be a housing 
inspector and obtains entrance to an apartment has violated 
the statute. The requirement that an act be performed in 
the capacity of public servant insures that otherwise innocent 
impersonations, such as wearing a judge's robes to a costume 
ball, are not covered by the statute. 
Subsection (b) (1) rejects any possible defense based 
upon nonexistence of the office the impersonator pretended 
to hold while subsection (b) (2) recognizes that a public 
servant can commit the offense by impersonating another 
public servant. The exclusion provided in subsection (c) is 
necessary to insure that peace officers engaged in undercover 
work in which it is necessary to impersonate a public servant 
will not be subject to criminal penalties for the impersonation. 
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CHAPTER 56, ARTICLE 6. ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 
I. Section 11.56.850. OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT 
The Code provision on official misconduct applies to 
all " public servants, " a term defined in§ ll.81.900(b) (47) and 
discussed in the commentary to§ 11.56.100. To commit the 
offense, a class A misdemeanor, the public servant must act 
with an intent to obtain a "benefit" (defined in§ ll.81.900(b) (3)) 
or with an intent to injure or deprive another person of a benefit. 
Mere negligent behavior, or awareness that a person is being injuL 
or deprived of a benefit will not establish the requisite culpability. 
The statute covers acts of both malfeasance and nonfeasance. 
The public servant must act or refrain from acting with a con­
scious objective to obtain a benefit or to injure or deprive 
another person of a benefit. Acting with the requisite 
intent, the public servant can violate the statute in one of 
two ways. 
Subsection (1) applies to acts constituting a knowing 
unauthorized exercise of the public servant's function. 
For example, a court clerk may be on notice that 
papers in a pending action were ordered "sealed," 
subject to inspection only upon a further court 
order. If such clerk, with intent to benefit a 
certain party, knowingly displays the "sealed" 
papers to such party without the requtsite court 
order, he would be guilty of official misconduct 
as defined in subdivision 1, i.e., he committed 
an act relating to his office but such act con­
stituted an unauthorized exercise of his official 
functions. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 195. 00, Commentary at 386 (1975). 
Under subsection (2) the crime may be committed by the 
public servant knowingly refraining from performing a duty. 
Subsection (2) requires knowledge both of the duty and that it 
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is imposed by law or clearly inherent in the nature of the 
office. 
II. Section 11.56.860. MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
The Code provision restates existing AS 37.51.010, but 
applies to all public servants. If disclosure of confidential 
information occurs in a legal proceeding it must be in con­
formity with a court order. By requiring that a court order 
be obtained prior to disclosure, the Code makes it less 
likely that the statute will be circumvented in private 
litigation where the person whose privacy interests are at 
stake may not be represented. Nothing in the provision pro-
hibits the public servant from disclosing confidential infor­
mation in the legal proceeding so long as the disclosure is 
in conformity with a court order. 
It is important to note that the provision is very strict 
in defining what is con:idential information; unless the infor­
mation is classified pursuant to a specific statute it is not 
"confidential." Thus, the Code provision does not give rise 
to the same kind of issues which have arisen, for example, 
when recent federal legislation has been challenged as in­
hibiting public disclosure of governmental misconduct or shielding 
documents which had been classified "secret" by a bureaucrat 
acting on his own concept of what is confidential. 
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CHAPTER 61, ARTICLE 1. RIOT, DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND 
RELATED OFFENSES. 
I. Section 11.61.100. RIOJ 
Riot is classified as a C felony. Rioters who commit 
crimes during the course of a riot will additionally be 
subject to prosecution under statutes describing specific 
offenses. 
Since the statute does not specify a culpable mental state 
the general rules of culpability apply (§ ll.81.610(b)). 
The rioter must act recklessly; he must be aware of and 
consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that his conduct is causing or that he is creating a sub­
stantial risk of causing property damage or physical injury. 
The requirement in the definition of recklessly that the 
risk be "of such a nature and degree that disregard of it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct 
that a reasonable person whould observe" insures that the 
statute does not apply to such trivial injury to property 
as walking on seeded grass adjacent to a sidewalk .  
In accordance with recent Alaska Supreme Court decisions 
emphasizing the importance of safeguarding the exercise 
of constitutional rights (�ee, ��, Poole v. State, 
524 P2d 286 (1974); Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P2d 
644 (1972)), the statute requires that the rioter's conduct 
be tumultuous and violent. This element precludes appli­
cation of the statute to persons exercising constitution­
ally protected rights of speech and assembly. Behavior 
that is merely tumultuous will be insufficient to sustain 
a conviction under the statute. 
II. Section 11. 61.110. DISORDERLY CONDUCT 
Disorderly conduct is a class B misdemeanor carrying 
a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 days. The Code pro­
vision substantially restates existing AS 11.45.030 but 
is designed to avoid constitutional problems that have 
arisen under paragraph (1) of that statute. 
Paragraph (1) of the Code provision is directed pri­
marily at noisemaking within the confines of one's home or 
on private property of another with that person's consent. 
By requiring that the victim not be on the same premises, 
the Code recognizes the privacy right of persons to act as 
they wish within their home so long as their conduct does 
not infringe upon others beyond the home. 
Under paragraph (1), a person acting with an intent 
to disturb the peace and privacy of another not physically 
on the same premises need not be shown to have actually dis­
turbed that person so long as he makes "unreasonably loud 
noise." The subsection also covers recklessly disturbing 
another's peace and privacy, i.e., boisterous party. The pro­
vision guards against vagueness and uneven enforcement 
problems in this situation by requiring that the defendant be 
warned that his conduct is disturbing others and that he con­
tinue his noisemaking before the offense has occured. 
Paragraph (2) parallels paragraph (1) but does not 
require that the person who is disturbed be on separate 
premises if the defendant is in a public place (defined in 
§ ll.81.900(b) (45) or on private property of another with­
out the owner's consent. 
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In Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972) 
the court noted that the phrase "unreasonable noise" with-
out more might be considered "indefinite. " Subsection (b) both 
clarifies the meaning of unreasonably loud noise and insures 
that free speech will not be infringed upon by specifically 
providing that "noise" does not include speech that is 
constitutionally protected. Under the Code the exercise 
of protected first amendment rights can never constitute 
disorderly conduct. 
The phrase "peace and privacy" in paragraphs (1) and (2) 
is also intended to take into account the varying nature of 
circumstances surrounding the noise making. Persons attending 
a sporting event or a peace officer, for example, would have 
a lower expectation of peace and privacy than a person 
attending a poetry reading or the ordinary citizen. C.f., 
Anniskette v. State, 489 P.2d 1012, 1015 n.5 (Alaska 1971). 
Paragraphs (3) and (4) are taken from existing AS 
ll.45.030 (a) (2). Paragraph (3), punishing a refusal to 
disperse in a public place when a crime has occured, has 
been upheld against a claim of unconstitutionality. State 
v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316 (Alaska 1975). Paragraph (5) en­
compasses unlawful fighting, and challenging another to fight. 
Though such a challenge is in fact a communication, it 
generally falls beyond the pale of protected speech since 
it constitutes an incitement to a breach of the peace. 
See, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). 
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Paragraph (6) prohibits the reckless creation of 
"a hazardous condition for others by an act which has no 
legal justification or excuse." An example of conduct covered 
under this provision would include shouting "fire " in a 
crowded auditorium. 
Paragraph (7) covers intentionally exposing specified 
parts of the body to another with reckless disregard for 
the offensive or insulting effect the act may have on that 
person. The provision is considerably broader than a 
typical indecent exposure statute since it does not require 
that the defendant act with an intent to gratify his or 
another's sexual desires. Note, however, that the provision 
would not apply if the viewer consented to the conduct, or 
if exposure took place under circumstances where the actor 
was not reckless as to the effect of the conduct - i.e., 
dancer in a topless bar. 
III. Section 11.61.120. HARASSMENT 
The crime of harassment, a class B misdemeanor, can 
be committed in any of five ways, each of which requires 
that the defendant act with an "intent to harass or annoy " 
another. The terms "harass" and "annoy" have in other con­
texts, been subject to strict constitutional scrutiny when 
used to describe results of conduct. See, Poole v. State, 
524 P.2d 286 (Alaska (1974); Marks v. City of Anchorage, 
500 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1972). The Code, however, uses these 
terms not to describe a result of conduct which might vary 
with the "ideological vicissitudes" of the victim, 
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but rather to describe the specific intent with which 
the defendant must act. See Anniskette v. State, 489 
P.2d 1012, 1015 (Alaska 1971). 
Paragraph (1) prohibits insulting, taunting, or challeng­
ing another in a manner likely to provoke an immediate and 
violent response. Directed principally at preserving the 
public peace, the provision will penalize speech only when 
it falls within the unprotected "fighting words" category. 
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
Paragraph (2) covers another form of harassing conduct 
in which a call may be placed, and the line held open in­
definitely after the call is answered. The defendant must 
act with an intent to impair the ability of the person to 
place or receive telephone calls. 
Paragraph (3) prohibits repeated telephone calls at 
extremely inconvenient hours. Use of the word "repeated" is 
intended to preclude a prosecution based on a single call. 
However, if the calls continue, and if it can be shown that the 
defendant acted with an intent to harrass or annoy the 
recipient, prosecution could then be brought. Paragraph 
(4) applies to the making of a single anonymous or obscene 
telephone call or a call that threatens physical injury. 
Paragraph (5) covers subjecting a person to offensive 
physical contact if done with an intent to harass or annoy. 
Conduct included in this category would be minor shoves or 
slaps that do not qualify as "physical injury" as well as 
sexual touchings that do not qualify as sexual assaults. 
97. 
IV, Section 11. 61.130. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING A CORPSE 
This statute provides that a person commits the crime of 
misconduct involving a corpse, a class A misdemeanor, if he 
intentionally disinters, removes, conceals, mutilates or 
engages in sexual penetration of a corpse. By including 
within the coverage of the statute the act of concealing 
a corpse, the provision allows for prosecution of the person 
who conceals the death of a child, conduct now prohibited in 
AS 11. 4 0 . 0 9 0 . 
The qualifying phrase in paragraph (1) "except as author­
ized by law or in an emergency" exempts from coverage of the 
statute the legitimate activities of persons such as coroners, 
physicians, ambulance attendants, and morticians as well as 
the good samaritan who might remove a corpse from a fire or 
automobile wreck. 
Misconduct involving a corpse also occurs when a person 
detains a corpse for a debt. This prohibition parallels 
the coverage of the existing "attaching or detaining a dead 
body for debt" statute, AS 11. 40.450. 
V. Section 11. 61. 140. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
The Code classifies as an A misdemeanor the intentional 
infliction of "severe and prolonged physical pain or suffering 
on an animal." "Animal" is defined in subsection (c) to ex­
clude human beings, fish and nonvertebrates. If the animal is 
simply killed without the consent of the owner and without 
the defendant inflicting severe pain, the conduct will con­
stitute criminal mischief under§ 11. 46.482-486. 
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Subsection (b) provides that it is a defense that the 
conduct conformed to accepted veterinary practice or was 
part of scientific research governed by accepted standards. 
The additional granting of the defense when the conduct is 
necessarily incident to lawful hunting or trapping activities 
avoids unnecessary overlap and potential conflict with rules 
and regulations established by the Board of Fish and Game. 
Subsection (a) (2)&(3) substantially restate existing 
AS 11.40.520. Under subsection (3), as under existing law, 
persons who attend exhibitions of fighting animals are held 
to be equally culpable as perso_ns who organize such conduct. 
v. Section 11.61.150. OBSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAYS
The Code provides that the crime of obstruction of
highways, a class B misdemeanor, may take place in either of 
two ways. The first, described in subsection (a) (1), imposes 
liability if the defendant knowingly places, drops or permits 
dangerous material to be left on a highway. This provision 
would cover, for example, the conduct of a person hauling 
ground glass to a dump when he knows that part of his load 
has fallen onto the road. Subsection (c) grants the defendant 
an affirmative defense if he can establish that he took 
immediate steps to rectify the situation and that, in fact, 
no one was injured. 
Subsection (a) (2) covers the defendant who knowingly 
renders a highway impassable. The person who parks his car in 
the middle of a busy road to watch salmon spawning in a near­
by stream, for example, would violate the statute if he knew 
that his conduct would result in making the road "impassable, 
or passable only with unreasonable inconvenience or hazard." 
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CHAPTER 61, ARTICLE 2. WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES 
I. Section 11.61.200. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN
THE FIRST DEGREE
Misconduct involving weapons in the first degree is the
most serious weapons offense in the Code and is classified 
as a class C felony. 
Subsection (a)(l) prohibits felons from possessing 
firearms capable of being concealed on their person. 
Subsection (a) (2) expands existing law by covering the 
person who sells or transfers a firearm capable of being 
concealed on the person knowing that the transferee has been 
convicted of a felony. The transferor who acts with such 
knowledge is viewed as equally culpable and deserving of 
identical punishment as the transferee. 
Subsection (b) provides an affirmative defense to 
subsections (a)(l) and (2) that the felon has received a 
pardon, that the prior conviction has been set aside, or if 
a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the 
defendant's unconditional discharge on the prior felony and 
the date of the possession, sale or transfer of the firearm. 
"Unconditional discharge" is defined in 12.55.185(82 in a 
manner to insure that the five year period does not begin to 
run until the defendant has completed any probationary 
period or time on parole. 
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Subsection (a)(3) is new to existing law and is patterned 
after the prohibitions found in the National Firearms Act, 
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872. Key to the provision is the definition 
of "prohibited weapon" in subsection (e)(l). Such weapons 
have little or no legitimate function, are unnecessary for 
protection and are not commonly used for commercial or 
recreational purposes. Substantial risk of harm to others 
and the furtherance of crime result from private possession 
of such weapons. The conduct proscribed is the manufacture, 
possession, transportation, sale or transfer of the weapon. 
Subsection (c) provides that the prohibitions of subsection 
(a)(3) are inapplicable if possession of the weapon was 
pursuant to registration under the National Firearms Act. 
Subsection (d) exempts peace officers acting within the 
scope and authority of their employment from the prohibitions 
against "prohibited weapons". If the use of a prohibited 
weapon has been authorized by a law enforcement agency, 
peace officers should not be subject to prosecution for 
possession of such weapons when they act within the scope 
and authority of their employment. 
Subsection (a)(4) covers the person who sells or transfers 
a firearm to a person knowing that the physical or mental 
condition of that person is substantially impaired. The 
buyer or transferee of such weapon is covered in§ 210(a)(l). 
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Subsection (a) (5) and (6) prohibit removing or destroying 
the manufacturer's serial number on a firearm with intent to 
render the firearm untraceable, or possessing a firearm 
knowing that the serial number has been removed with intent 
to render the firearm untraceable. Such conduct has no 
legitimate purpose and indicates future use of the firearm 
in criminal activity. 
II. Section 11.61.210. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN 
THE SECOND DEGREE 
The second degree weapons offense, a class A misdemeanor, 
prohibits three forms of conduct. 
Subsection (a)(l) is based on the prohibition found in 
existing AS 11.55.070, Possession of firearm while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or drug. The Code provision 
requires that the person's physical or mental condition be 
substantially impaired, a standard that will cove.r a narrower 
range of behavior than the existing "under the influence" 
test. 
Subsection (a)(2) is based substantially on existing 
AS 11. 55. 065. The term "highway" is defined in §11. 81. 900 (b) (242. 
Subsection (a)(3) prohibits a person from discharging a 
firearm with reckless disregard for the risk of damage to 
property or risk of physical injury. The prohibition is 
similar to the crime of reckless endange.rment, §11. 41. 250, 
but covers a broader range of behavior. 
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III. Section 11.61.220. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN 
THE THIRD DEGREE 
Misconduct involving weapons in the third degree, a 
class B misdemeanor, prohibits three forms of conduct. 
Subsection (a) (1) prohibits a person from knowingly 
possessing a deadly weapon, other than an ordinary pocket 
knife, that is concealed on his person. Subsection (e) 
describes when a deadly weapon is concealed on a person. A 
weapon that is concealed in an automobile is not concealed 
on a person. 
The affirmative defense provided in subsection (b)(l) 
recognizes that the privacy right of Alaska's citizens to 
carry concealed weapons in their dwelling or on property 
appurtenant to their dwelling outweighs law enforcement's 
interest in regulating such activity. The defense specified 
in subsection (b)(2) was added to insure that a person 
actually engaged in lawful hunting, fishing, trapping or 
other lawful outdoor sporting activity that necessarily 
involved the carrying of a weapon for personal protection, 
would not be subject to prosecution under the concealed 
weapons statute. Carrying a weapon under a parka, for example, 
to prevent it from getting wet should not result in criminal 
sanctions if the person is engaged in lawful hunting activity. 
The term "other lawful sporting activity" is broad enough to 
include activity such as hiking, if it can be shown that the 
carrying of the weapon was necessary for personal protection. 
103. 
Note that at the time of the possession the person 
must actually be engaged in the activity. The exclusion 
would not apply while the person was on his way to or from 
the activity. Under such circumstances the weapon must be 
carried openly or in a visible holster or case which gives 
notice of its contents. 
As under existing law, peace officers acting within the 
scope and authority of their employment are excluded from 
the concealed weapon prohibition in subsection (c). 
Subsection (a)(2) prohibits a person from possessing on 
his person a loaded firearm in any place where intoxicating 
liquor is sold for consumption on the premises. Subsection 
(f) describes when a firearm is loaded. This prohibition is 
supported by a survey of the 1975-76 arrest records of the 
Anchorage Police Department compiled by the Criminal Justice 
Center. The survey indicates that 18% of firearm assaults 
in Anchorage occurred in bars. Two exclusions to the prohibition 
are provided. Subsection (d) allows the owner of the establishment 
and his employees to possess such weapons within the course 
of their employment. Of course, if the weapon is concealed, 
the owner or his employees would be subject to prosecution 
under subsection (a)(l). Peace officers are excluded from 
the coverage of this prohibition under subsection (c). 
Subsection (a)(3) prohibits the possession of a firearm 
by an unemancipated minor under 16 without the consent of his 
parents. 
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IV. Section 11.61.230. POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
The Code provides that it is a class A misdemeanor to
possess, with intent to use, any tool, instrument or device 
adapted or designed for committing any of three property 
crimes - burglary, theft from the person, or theft of services. 
A preparatory offense, §230 is narrowly drafted to 
insure that otherwise innocent conduct does not fall within 
its coverage. The state must establish that the defendant 
possessed the item with intent to use or permit its use in 
the commission of one of the three target crimes. Additionally, 
unless the defendant possessed nitroglycerine, dynamite, "an 
acetylene torch, electric arc, burning bar, thermal lance, 
oxygen lance or other similar device capable of burning 
through steel, concrete, or other solid material," the state 
must establish that the tool was "adapted or designed for 
use" in committing one of the three target crimes. That the 
tool was "commonly used for committing" the offense is not 
sufficient. This exclusion is necessary to insure that 
possession of items such as screwdrivers, toothpicks or 
rubber gloves will not give rise to prosecution under the 
statute. 
It should be noted that some instances of possession of 
burglary tools can give rise to an attempted burglary prosecution 
under §11. 31.100. The crime of possession of burglary 
tools, however, allows official intervention in instances 
where the defendant possesses the tool with the requisite 
intent, but has not yet taken a substantial step toward the 
target offense. 105.
IV. Sections 11. 61.240;250. CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF
EXPLOSIVES: UNLAWFUL FURNISHING OF EXPLOSIVES
Both provisions prohibit unlawful transactions with
explosives and are new to existing law. The statues cover 
the possession of explosives with intent to commit a crime 
and the furnishing of explosives with knowledge that the 
person to whom they are furnished intends to commit a crime. 
The substantial danger of _widespread physical injury and 
property damage resulting from the unlawful use of explosives 
necessitates specific coverage of such conduct. The term 
"explosive" is defined in §ll.81.900(b)(18). 
As a preparatory crime, criminal possession of explosives 
is similar to the Code's general attempt statute, §11.31. 100. 
As noted in commentary to the Model Penal Code, the combination 
of an "intent to use" plus possession of materials which are 
specifically designed for unlawful use, or which can serve 
no lawful purpose of the defendant under the circumstances, 
should not be held insufficient as a matter of law to establish 
the substantial step requirement for attempt. MODEL PENAL 
CODE §5.01, Comment at 49(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Like 
the attempt statute, §240 requires the state to establish 
that the defendant intended to commit a crime. 
The classification of criminal possession of explosives 
is identical to attempt and is based on the crime intended 
by the defendant. Punishment is generally set at one degree 
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below the target offense. Possession of explosive� with 
intent to commit a class A felony, for example, is 
classified as a class B felony. 
The crime of unlawful furnishing of explosives provides 
that it is a class C felony to furnish an explosive 
substance or device to another knowing that the other person 
intends to use it to commit a crime. If it can be established 
that the defendant furnished the explosives "with intent 
to promote or facilitate the connnission of the offense'' the 
defendant would be legally accountable for the crime committed 
by the person to whom he furnished the explosives under 
§11. 16. 110. 
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CHAPTER 66, ARTICLE 1. PROSTITUTION AND RELATED OFFENSES 
I. Section 11.66.150. DEFINITIONS 
The term "person" is defined in § ll.81.900(b) (39) 
to include all natural persons. Consequently, the offenses 
defined in this article are "sex-neutral" and may be committed 
by a male or female. The masculine pronoun is used for draft­
ing convenience. 
A. Paragraph (1). Place of Prostitution 
This term is designed to insure that criminal 
sanctions can be applied against persons who use physical 
locations other than houses or apartments, such as boats, 
trailers or vans, for prostitution activities. 
B. Paragraph (2). Prostitution Enterprise 
This definition is designed to include agreements 
between a prostitute and a pimp, between two prostitutes, or 
larger scale activities. By the use of the term "organized," 
the definition excludes transactions involving only a prostitute 
and a patron. 
C. Paragraph (3). Sexual Conduct 
This term is defined to insure that pr.osti tution is 
not limited to heterosexual genital intercourse. By broadening 
the range of conduct covered by the article, the definition 
takes into account the realities of commerce in sexual services. 
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II. Section 11.66.100. PROSTITUTION 
This. section describes the underlying offense of the 
article and classifies it as a B misdemeanor. Only the 
acts of the prostitute are covered; the patron of the prosti­
tute does not commit a crime. 
Prostitution may be committed by a person engaging in 
sexual conduct in return for a fee or agreeing to or offering 
to engage in sexual conduct in return for a fee. The 
commercial character of the prohibited conduct is fixed by 
the use of the term "for hire." As with existing law, cash con­
sideration is not required. Note also that the statute covers 
all offers to engage in sexual conduct for hire. Solicitation 
is prohibited regardless of whether the offer occurs in a public 
place. 
III. Section 11.66.110. PROMOTING PROSTITUTION IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE 
This section, a class B felony, is designed to deal with 
the coercive aspects that may be involved in prostitution. 
Paragraph ( 1) imposes. ·liability if the defendant uses 
force to cause a person to engage in prostitution. If the force 
used qualifies as assault in the first degree, prosecution 
would be brought under that statute, a class A felony. 
Paragraph (2) provides that a person commits the first 
degree offense if, as other than a. patron, he causes a person under 
16 to engage in prostitution. Subsection (b) denies the defendant 
the defense of reasonable mistake as to age. The defendant 
is held strictly liable regarding the age of the victim. 
Paragraph (3) is designed to reach persons who may induce 
children, incompetents, or others in their legal custody to 
engage in prostitution. 
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DEGREE 
This section imposes C felony penalties on persons who run a 
prostitution enterprise other than a place of prostitution or pro­
cure or solicit patrons or prostitutes. The statute is aimed pri­
marily at the pimp. Note that paragraph (1) specifically excludes 
the conduct of running a place of prostitution. While deserving 
of criminal sanction, this conduct is not serious enough to 
warrant felony classification. The person who runs a place of 
prostitution will be covered under§ 130(a) (1) . 
V. Section 11. 66.130. PROMOTING PROSTITUTION IN THE THIRD
DEGREE 
The conduct prohi�ited in this section, a class A mis­
demeanor, must be engaged in with the specific intent to promote 
prostitution. The section is not intended to cover, for example, 
the landlord who unintentionally or unknowingly rents to prosti­
tutes. Further, even if a landlord knowingly rents to a prosti­
tute, he could not be held liable unless he acted with the 
intent to promote prostitution. 
Paragraph (1) covers the person who runs a place of 
prostitution. Aimed primarily at the "madame" the statute 
would also apply to any person who owned a place of prostitution. 
It is important to note that if the defendant runs a prosti­
tution enterprise, other than a place of prostitution, the 
provisions of§ 120(a) (1) would apply. 
Paragraph (2) covers the conduct of a person other than 
a patron who causes a persop .16 or older to engage in prosti­
tution. If the person was under 16, prosecution would be brought 
under§ ll0(a) (2) . If the defendant ran a prostitution enter-
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IV. Section 11. 66.120. PROMOTING PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND
prise, other than a place of prostitution, or procured patrons 
for the prostitute, prosecution would be brought under§ 120. 
Paragraph (3) is directed at the person who knowingly 
derives a profit from prostitution while paragraph (4) is in­
tended to reach conduct which enables prostitution activities to 
occur such as the procurring of prostitutes or the transpor­
tation of prostitutes. It bears repeating that the conduct 
must be engaged in with the intent to promote prostitution. 
This paragraph would not reach the conduct of a cab driver 
who drove a person to a place of prostitution not knowing it 
to be such; or, knowing it to be such but not acting with the 
intent to promote prostitution. 
VI. Section 11.66.140. EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR SECTIONS
120 - 130 OF THIS C HAPTER 
This section will reverse the effect of AS 12.45.040, 
as interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court in Johnson v. State, 
501 P.2d 762 (Alaska 1972) . The existing statute requires 
corroboration of the testimony of a prostitute to insure that 
alleged "victims" were not motivated by blackmail, malice or 
abnormal psychological conditions. As drafted, § 140 is 
consistent with the Code provision regarding corroboration in 
perjury cases (see§ 11.56.220) and with existing corrobor­
ation requirements in rape cases. 
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CHAPTER 66, ARTICLE 2. GAMBLING OFFENSES 
Introduction 
This article initiates a comprehensive revision of 
Alaska's gambling laws. For the most part the coverage 
of existing law has been preserved although emphasis has 
been changed in several instances. The code changes 
existing law in two significant ways. 
1. The Code excludes from the prohibitions of 
the criminal law the "friendly poker game" by recognizing 
an affirmative defense to gambling that the defendant 
engaged in gambling solely as a player in a home where no 
house income, other than personal winnings, resulted from 
the game. 
2. The Code focuses on organized crime by 
creating a felony offense of promoting gambling which 
applies to the person who promotes or profits from an 
unlawful gambling enterprise. 
I. Section 11.66.280(2). DEFINITION OF "GAMBLING" 
In the Code,"'gambling' means that a person stakes 
or risks something of value upon the outcome of a contest 
of chance or a future contingent event not under his control 
or influence, upon an agreement or understanding that he or 
someone else will receive something of value in the event 
of a certain outcnr •." See State v. Pinball Machines, 404 
P.2d 923, 925 (Alaska 1965). The terms "contest of chance" 
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and "something of value" are defined in § 280 (1) & (10). 
The definition includes any activity that brings a profit 
based on chance and includes ordinary lotteries. Games 
of pure skill, i. e. , chess, will not be considered gambling 
if the contestants bet against each other. Placing a side 
bet on a game of chess, however, would be gambling because, 
from the onlooker's perspective, the outcome depends on 
"chance" as he has no control over the outcome. 
The exceptions to the definition of "gambling" in 
subsection (A) are necessary to exclude stock, commodity, 
and insurance transactions from the scope of the gambling 
definition. The exception in subsection (B) excludes from 
the definition of "gambling" playing a pinball machine that 
is only able to "pay-off" in free games. The provision 
changes existing law under which such machines have been 
held to be gambling implements subject to seizure. Pinball 
Machines v. State, 371 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1962); State v. 
Pinball Machines, 404 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1965). Note, however, 
that any pinball machine that contains any method or device 
(commonly referred to as a "knock-off" button) whereby free 
games may be cancelled or revoked does not come under the 
exception. A machine that has such a device indicates the 
strong likelihood that "free games" are being exchanged for 
some other form of consideration. 
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II. Section 11.66. 280(1). DEFINITION OF "CONTEST OF CHANCE" 
In Morrow v. State, 511 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1973) the 
court considered the issue of whether a ''football card" is 
a lottery. The court adopted the "dominant factor" approach 
by holding that a "scheme constitutes a lottery where chance 
dominates the distribution of prizes even though such a 
distribution is affected to some degree by the exercise of 
skill or judgement. " The Code follows the approach taken by 
other revised codes, [see, e.g. , N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 225.00(1) ; 
OR. REV. STAT. § 167. 177(1)] in postulating a similar 
definition, but not adopting the " dominant factor" test. 
In many instances it will be virtually impossible to 
determine whether chance or skill dominates. " It should 
be sufficient that, despite the importance of skill in any 
given game, the outcome depends in a material degree upon 
an element of chance." N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 225.00, Commentary 
at 23 (McKinney 1967). 
III. Section 11. 66. 200. GAMBLING 
Subject to the "social game" affirmative defense, the 
Code prohibits all forms of unlawful gambling. A first con­
viction of gambling is classified as a violation punishable by 
a maximum $300 fine. See§ 12. 55.035 (b) (4). Second and 
subsequent convictions, however, are punishable as B mis­
demeanors. The definition of "unlawful" '[§ 11.66. 280(11)] 
provides that no gawbling practice is lawful unless it is 
specifically authorized by statute. See generally, AS 05.15 
(Bingo, Raffles and Ice Pools). 
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The affirmative defense in subsection (b) (which the 
defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence) 
exempts " friendly games" and "friendly best" from the 
coverage of the statute. The defense requires that the 
defendant first establish that he is a player. "Player" 
is defined in § 280(6). That definition requires that 
the person engage in gambling solely as a contestant or 
bettor without receiving any profit from the gambling 
other than his winnings and without rendering material 
assistance to the gambling. Conduct directed toward the 
establishment of a social· game is specifically excluded 
from the definition of " material assistance." The equal 
risk and chance provision in the definition of "player" 
does not refer to the advantage enjoyed by a skilled player; 
rather, it excludes the affirmative defense to those who 
cheat at otherwise social games. 
The affirmative defense also requires that the player 
establish that he participated in a " social game" . That 
term is defined in § 280(9) as "gambling in a home where. 
there is no house income from the operation of the game." 
If the house or banker has an advantage because of the 
way the game is conducted, the affirmative defense is 
denied to all participants since a social game requires 
that no "house player, house bank or house odds exist." 
Thus, under the Code, gambling in a home where there is no 
house player, bank, odds, or income is not subject to 
criminal penalties. If the gambling occurs elsewhere, 
for example, in a park or in a bar, the affirmative defense 
is denied even though no house income or odds exist. 
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IV. Sections 11. 66.210-220. PROMOTING GAMBLING IN THE FIRST 
AND SECOND DEGREE 
Sections 210 and 220 provide broad coverage of 
all forms of gambling exploitation. In doing so, the Code 
changes existing law by providing felony penalities for the 
promoting of or profiting from large schale gambling 
enterprises. Both the terms "profits from gambling" and 
"promoting gambling" are defined to exclude the person who 
merely participates in gambling as a player. The player is 
covered by § 200, Gambling. 
Section 220 provides that it is a class A 
misdemeanor to engage in either of two forms of gambling 
activity. The first is "promoting" unlawful gambling. This 
term is defined in § 280(8) to include any activity that goes 
beyond being a player, including setting up the game, 
acquisition of the necessary equipment, bringing in the 
players, and financing the operation. Again, note that the 
person who merely arranc;es for a social game is a " player" 
and does not fall within the coverage of either degree of 
promoting gambling. 
The second activity prohibited is "profiting" 
from unlawful gambling. This term is defined in § 280(7) 
and covers the receipt by persons other than players of 
money or other property as proceeds from gambling activity 
based on a prior agreement or understanding to that effect. 
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Section 210 provides class C felony penalities 
for promoting or profiting from an unlawful gambling enter­
prise. The term "gambling enterprise" is defined in 
§ 280 (4) . Subsections (A) and (B) of that definition are 
taken directly from the federal gambling statute. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1955. It is expected that federal case law interpreting 
18 U. S.C. § 1955 will be highly relevant in the interpreta­
tion of these sections of the Code definition. 
A "qualified organization" ,  as defined in 
AS 05.15. 210 (15) , is excluded from the definition of "gambling 
enterprise" by sebsection (C) . This provision insures that 
groups such as non profit charitable or fraternal organizations 
are not subject to felony penalities if unlawful gambling occurs 
on their premises. It should be noted, however, that such 
organizations would be subject to misdemeanor penalities for 
promoting or profiting from such activity under § 220. 
V. Sections 11.66. 230-.240. POSSESSION OF GAMBLING RECORDS 
IN THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE 
Sections 230 and 240 prohibit the possession of 
"gambling records". The term "gambling record" is defined 
in 11. 66.280 (5) as any writing or paper of a kind commonly 
used in the operation or promotion of unlawful gambling." 
Both provisions require that the defendant possess the 
gambling record with knowledge of its contents or character. 
Division of the offense into two degrees parallels 
the Code's treatment of promoting gambling by distinguishing 
between large and small scale operators. If the gambling 
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record is of a kind commonly used in the operation of an 
unlawful gambling enterprise (i. e. , records reflecting the 
operation of a large scale gambling business) the possessor 
has committed the first degree offense, a class C felony. 
Possession of other gambling records is a class A misdemeanor. 
The Code recognizes three affirmative defenses to 
· the possession offenses. The first defense, applicable only 
to the first degree crime, appears in§ 250(a) and is intended 
to preclude felony convictions in cases where the defendant 
is in possession of football cards or other tokens evidencing 
his own participation as a player in a gambling enterprise. 
Note that the affirmative defense applies only in a prosecution 
for the first degree offense; player status is no defense to 
prosecution under the second degree statute. 
The two remaining affirmative defenses appearing in 
§ 250(b) apply to both degrees of possession of gambling records. 
Subsection (b) (1) allows a defense when the defendant establishes 
that the gambling record is not intended to be used in the operation 
or promotion of unlawful gambling. Subsection (b) (2) provides 
an affirmative defense that the writing or paper is "used or 
intended to be used by the defendant in a social game" despite 
the fact that even "social games" are, by definition, unlawful 
gambling. Thus, the person who engages in a social game, will 
not be penalized for keeping score sheets or other writings or 
papers commonly used during such games. 
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VI. Section 11.66. 260. POSSESSION OF A GAMBLING DEVICE 
This section prohibits the unlawful possession of 
all gambling devices. Possession of a gambling device is a 
class A misdemeanor. The term " gambling device ", is defined 
in Sec. 11.66.280 (3) as "any device, machine, paraphernalia 
or equipment that is used or usable in the playing phases of 
unlawful gambling", other than lottery tickets or policy slips 
(possession of which is punishable as possession of gambling 
records, Sec. 11.66.230, 240) . The definition of gambling 
device also specifically excludes pinball machines that only 
"pay-off" in free games. 
The conduct prohibited by the statute includes the 
manufacture, sale, transportation, and possession of any gambling 
device or the conducting or negotiating of any transaction 
affecting or designed to affect ownership, custody or use of 
such items. The prosecution must establish that the defendant 
knew that the device was to be used in the promotion of unlawful 
gambling. This culpable mental state requirement insures that 
a prima facie case of possession of a gambling device cannot 
rest on proof that the defendant possessed such otherwise 
innocuous items as chips or a deck of playing cards, which 
would otherwise be covered because of the broad definition 
of a gambling device. 
VII. Section 11.66.270. FORFEITURE. 
This provision authorizes the forfeiture of gambling 
devices, gambling records and money used as a bet or a stake 
in unlawful gambling. Paragraph (2) authorizes the forfeiture 
of all money seized during a gambling raid if that money is 
not found on the person, i.e., on a poker table. Seizure of 
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money found on the person is authorized under paragraph (B) 
only if it is found on a oerson who directs an unlawful 
eamblin� enterorise. Note that this section does not 
snecifv the orocedure for forfeiture or the methods of 
disposing of the forfeited property. These issues should 
be addressed in future legislation. 
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CHAPTER 76. MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES 
I. Section 11.76.100. SELLING OR GIVING TOBACCO TO A MINOR 
This section prohibits a person 19 or older from giving 
or selling tobacco to a person under 16. Violation of the 
statute is punishable by a $300 fine. 
II. Section 11.76.110. INTERFERENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 
This section consolidates two existing statutes based on 
U.S.C. § 241, 242 (1970) into a single provision, classified 
as an A misdemeanor. 
Subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) substantially restate existing 
AS 11.60.340 but unlike existing law, do not require that 
the defendant conspire with another. While the developing 
concept of rights guaranteed by the state constitution requires 
protection, the risks inherent in application of a conspiracy 
law to very generally described conduct outweighs possible 
benefits in protecting those rights. 
Elimination of the existing conspiracy requirement 
simultaneously broadens the coverage of the statute while 
restricting its application to conduct that achieves the 
unlawful objective of interference with protected rights. 
A single defendant, acting with the requisite intent, who 
injures, oppresses, threatens or intimidates another, or 
engages in conduct consitituting a substantial step toward the 
commission of such acts, will be subject to criminal penalties 
under the Code, irrespective of whether he has conspired with 
another. On the other hand, a person who conspires with another 
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to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate a third person either 
with intent to deprive that third person of a protected right 
or because he has exercised such a right, will not be subject 
to criminal penalties unless he has completed the "substantial 
step" necessary for attempt. 
Subsection (a) (3) parallels existing AS 11.60.350 
and requires that the defendant, ·acting under color of 
law, ordinance, or regulation of the state or one of its 
political subdivisions, "intentionally deprive another of a 
right, privilege or immunity," grant_ed by state law or the 
state constitution. 
While the section generally requires that the defendant 
act intentionally, use of the phrase "in fact" to describe 
the protected rights means the defendant need not be aware 
that the right, privilege or immunity with which he is inter­
fering is of statutory or constitutional origin. This conforms 
with case law under the parallel federal statute. See 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) . Under subsection 
(b), whether the right, privilege or immunity is "in fact" 
secured by the constitution or laws of the state is a question 
of law rather than one for jury determination. 
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CHAPTER 81. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 1. GENERAL PURPOSES 
I. Section 11. 81.100. GENERAL PURPOSES 
This section states the general philosophy behind the 
Title 11 revisions and serves as an aid in the interpretation 
of individual sections. 
ARTICLE 2. APPLICABILITY OF C RIMINAL STATUTES 
II. Section 11.81.200. EFFECT OF AMENDMENT OR REPEAL OF 
CRIMINAL STATUTES 
This section provides that the amendment or repeal 
of a criminal statute does not affect the "accusation, pro­
secution, conviction and punishment" of a person who violated 
the statute prior to the effective date of the repeal or 
amendment. A similar, more general provision is found in 
AS 01. 05. 021. 
III. Section 11.81.210. LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY 
This section is based on existing AS 11.75.010 and 
emphasizes that the applicability of criminal penalties to 
conduct prohibited in the Code does not affect private rights 
of action available to victims of such conduct. 
This Code does not, however, include provisions authorizing 
treble damages for violation of specific statutes since 
in many instances actual damages would be nominal. To expressly 
provide for an award of three times such damages might 
jeopardize existing rights to recover substantial punitive 
damages for wilful misconduct. This section is designed to 
remove any question that compensatory and punitive damages 
can be recovered in appropriate cases in a civil action based 
on tortious conduct classified as an offense in the Code. 
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IV. Section 11. 81. 220. ALL OFFENSES DEFINED BY STATUTE 
This section requires all offenses to be declared by 
statute or regulation and has the effect of abolishing common 
law crimes which have not been specifically adopted by 
statute or regulation. 
ARTICLE 3. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES 
V. Section 11. 81. 250. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES 
This section lists the six classes of offenses in title 11: 
Class A, B and C felonies, class A and B misdemeanors and violations. 
Only three offenses are not classified: murder in the first and 
second degree and kidnapping. 
The terms "offense, " "crime, " "felony, " "misdemeanor," 
and "violation" are defined in § 1 1. 81.900. All forms of pro­
hibited conduct described in the Code are offenses. An offense 
is either a crime or a violation. A crime is an offense for 
which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized. Crimes are 
either felonies or misdemeanors. A felony is a crime for which 
a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is authorized. 
A misdemenaor is a crime for which a sentence for a term of 
more than one year may not be imposed. A violation is a non­
criminal offense punishable only by a fine. 
Offenses are classified based on the type of injury 
"characteristically caused or risked by commission of the offense 
and the culpability of the defendant." The injury risked or 
caused may be to a person, property, the family, public 
administration, public order, or public health and decency. 
The "culpability of the defendant" refers to which culpable 
mental state -- intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, criminal 
negligence the defendant committed the acts constituting the 
offense. 
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CHAPTER 81, ARTICLE 4. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION 
I. INTRODUCTION
Key to the article are three terms -- "force, " " deadly
force" and "nondeadly force." 
"Force" is defined in§ ll.81.900(b) (22) as "any bodily 
impact, restraint, or confinement; force includes deadly and 
nondeadly force." "Deadly force" rnearis "force which the person 
uses with the intent of causing, or uses under circumstances 
which he knows creates a substantial risk of causing, death 
or serious physical injury; 'deadly force' includes intention­
ally discharging a firearm in the direction of another person 
or in the direction in which another person is believed to 
be", § ll.81.900(b}(12) . The term "nondeadly force" "means 
force other than deadly force, " § ll.81. 900 (b) (32}. 
The use of any degree of force is justified only "when 
and to the extent . . .  [the person claiming the defense] reason-
ably believes . . . [force] necessary." The defendant must sub-
jectively believe that the use of force is necessary and that 
belief must have been objectively reasonable under the circum­
stances. A reasonable man standard is adopted. Further, even 
though a particular degree of force may be authorized, the use of 
such force will not be justified if it was not reasonable to be­
lieve that such force was necessary to accomplish the person's 
objective. For example, while deadly force is authorized in 
§ 350 to terminate burglary in an occupied building, the
shooting of a burglarer who is known to be an unarmed 
juvenile is not likely to be viewed by the trier of fact as 
reasonably necessary to terminate the burglary. Nondeadly 
force should have been used, or deadly force should have been 
threatened. 
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II. Section 11.81.300. JUSTIFICATION: DEFENSE 
The _section classifies the various forms of justification 
described in§ 320-430 as defenses. If some evidence of justi­
fication is admitted at trial the state will have the burden of 
disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See defini­
tion of "defense" in§ ll.81.900(b) (15). 
III. Section 11.81.320. JUSTIFICATION: NECESSITY 
Under the necessity defense, conduct which would otherwise 
be criminal may be justified if the defendant avoids a greater 
injury by engaging in that conduct. Examples of possible 
application of the necessity defense would include blasting 
a b
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uilding to prevent a major fire from spreading or forcibly 
restraining a person infected with a highly contagious and 
dangerous disease. 
The Code does not contain a statutory formulation of 
the necessity defense. Instead, the defense is incorporated 
into the Code "to the extent.permitted by common law." Under 
subsection (1) the defense will be inapplicable if another 
statute covers the defense in the particular situation involved. 
See,�, § 11.46.340. Subsection (2) provides that the defense 
does not apply if a legislative intent to exclude the defense 
plainly appears. 
IV. Sections 11.81.330; 335. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF NONDEADLY 
AND DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF SELF 
A. Section 11.81.330 - NONDEADLY FORCE 
Subsection (a) allows a person to use nondeadly force 
to defend himself from what he reasonably believes to be1 the 
use of unlawful force. Since force is defined to include the 
threat of imminent bodily impact, a person may defend himself 
from threats of imminent impact as well as actual impact. 
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Paragraphs (1) - (3) qualify the right of a person to use 
nondeadly force in self-defense. Under paragraph (1) , neither 
party to mutual combat which is not authorized by law can claim 
self-defense. Paragraph (2) prohibits a person from provoking 
another person into using force and later claiming that his 
use of force in self-defense was justified. Finally, paragraph 
(3) prevents an initial aggressor from claiming self-defense. 
Subsection (b) provides that even in the three circum­
stances described in paragraphs (1) -(3) a person can nevertheless 
use nondeadly force if he withdraws from the encounter and 
effectively communicates his withdrawal to the other person. 
If the other person continues the incident by the use 
of unlawful force, nondeadly force may then be used in 
self-defense. 
B. Section 11.81.335 - DEADLY FORCE 
As a prerequisite to the use of deadly force in self­
defense, subsection (a) (1) requires that the use of nondeadly 
force would have been justified. If the use of nondeadly force 
would have been justified, subsection (a) (2) allows a person 
to use deadly force when and to the extent he reasonably believes 
it necessary to defend himself from death, serious physical 
injury, kidnapping, forcible sexual assault or robbery. 
Subsection (b) requires a person to retreat prior to using 
deadly force. Retreat is not required when the defender is 
(1) on premises, including a dwelling, which he owns or leases 
and when he is not the original aggressor, (2) a peace officer 
acting within the scope and authority of his employment, or 
(3) a person assisting a peace officer in making an arrest. 
Note that there is no duty to retreat prior to using nondeadly 
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force. Further, the defendant must know that he has a safe 
retreat; it is not enough that a reasonable person would have 
believed he could have retreated safely. 
V. Section 11.81.340. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF A THIRD PERSON 
The Code allows a person to come to the aid of any 
third person when the rescuer reasonably believes that the 
third person would be justified in using force to defend 
himself. The intervenor may use that degree of force which he 
reasonably believes the third person would be justified in 
using in his own defense. 
VI. Section 11. 81. 350. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE 
OF PROPERTY AND PREMISES 
Subsection (a) provides that a person may use nondeadly 
force to terminate the commission or attempted commission of 
an unlawful taking or damaging of property or services. 
Included in this category would be the crimes of theft, 
criminal mischief and concealment of merchandise. D eadly 
force may be used under subsection (b) to terminate the 
commission or attempted commission of arson upon a dwelling or 
occupied building. 
Under subsection (c) a person in possession or control 
of premises, or an express or implied agent of that person may 
use nondeadly force to terminate the commission or attempted 
commission of a criminal trespass, and deadly force to terminate 
a burglary occurring in an occupied dwelling or building. Sub­
section (d) recognizes that a person defending property or 
land may be justified in using deadly force based on other 
sections of the justification article. For example, one who 
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destroys a person's only means of transportation from a remote 
bush site has in effect used deadly force against the owner if 
the destruction creates a substantial risk of serious physical 
injury -- i. e. , exposure, .starvation. In this case the use 
of deadly force in defense of person (not property} would 
be appropriate. 
Note that any person, not just the owner, is allowed 
to use force to prevent damage to property including arson. 
However, if the crime is criminal trespass (usually, unlawful 
entry onto land} or burglary, a person will be allowed 
to use force only if he is in possession or control of the 
premises, or is an "express or implied agent" of the owner of 
the premises, a term broad enough to cover a person who discovers 
a trespasser on his neighbor's land or a burglar in his neighbor's 
dwelling. 
VII. Section 11. 81.370. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF FORCE BY PEACE 
OFFICER IN MAKING AN ARREST OR TERMINATING AN ESCAPE 
Subsection (a} provides that a peace officer may use 
nondeadly force and may threaten to use deadly force whenever 
he reasonably believes it necessary to make an arrest, to 
terminate an escape or attempted escape from custody, or to make 
a lawful stop. In providing that nondeadly force may be used --
to effect a lawful stop, the Code insures that a peace officer 
will not be criminally liable for an assault prosecution for 
conducting a lawful stop of the kind described in Coleman v. 
State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976). 
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The introductory phrase "in addition to using force justi­
fied under other sections of this chapter" emphasizes that 
this section supplements the other sections in article 4 describing 
the justifiable use of force. For example, if in making an arrest 
the officer reasonably believes that the use of force is 
necessary in self-defense, the provisions of § 335 will sup­
plement the authority to use force described in this section. 
With regard to when deadly force may be used by a peace 
officer in making an arrest or.in terminating an escape or 
attempted escape from custody, the Code makes several changes 
in existing law. 
Pursuant to paragraph (1), a peace officer may use deadly 
force when and to the extent he reasonably believes it necessary 
to make an arrest or terminate an escape or attempted escape of 
a person he reasonably believes "has committed or attempted to 
commit a felony which involved the use of force against a person. " 
The felony had to be defined as involving the use of force against 
a person and the officer must have reasonably believed that 
force was in fact involved. Under this standard, for example, 
the use of deadly force would be justified in arresting a 
fleeing burglar who the officer reasonably believes has used 
force against an occupant of a building, a robber or a person 
who has committed or attempted to commit a felony assault. 
Deadly force would not be justified to arrest a person who the 
officer believes has committed a nonviolent felony such as 
forgery or theft, unless the use of deadly force is justified 
under paragraphs (2) or (3). 
Another situation justifying the use of deadly force by 
a peace officer involves the armed fleeing escapee. Under 
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paragraph (2) a peace officer may use deadly force to retake a 
person who has escaped or is attempting to escape from custody 
while in possession of a firearm on or about his person. 
Insofar as this paragraph allows a peace officer to use deadly 
force against a misdemeanant escapee who is not necessarily 
using his firearm it expands existing law. However, the factors 
of flight plus possession of a firearm should be sufficient 
evidence of dangerousne_ss to justify the use of deadly force 
if necessary to retake the escapee. Note also that a peace offic�­
in the immediate vicinity of a correctional facility at the tim� 
of an escape is afforded additional authority in using deadly force 
under§ 410, discussed infra. 
Paragraph (3) provides that a peace officer may use 
deadly force to effect an arrest or terminate an escape or 
attempted escape of a person who the officer reasonably believes 
"may otherwise endanger life or inflict serious physical injury 
unless arrested without delay." This section should give peace 
officers the necessary leeway to apprehend a person who has 
not committed a violent felony and who is not an escapee in 
possession of a firearm, but is nevertheless highly dangerous. 
Subsection (b) provides that the use of force by a peace 
officer is not justifiable unless the officer reasonably believes 
the arrest or stop to be lawful. 
Subsection (c) is included to emphasize that the provisions 
of this section only effect the right to use or threaten force 
in making an arrest. If an officer, for example, merely draws 
his weapon prior to entering a building in search of a criminal, 
the provisions of this section would be inapplicable since force 
had not been used or threatened against anyone. 
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VIII. Section 11. 81. 380. USE OF FORCE BY PRIVATE PERSON
ASSISTING AN ARREST OR TERMINATING AN ESCAPE 
AS 12.25.090 provides that "a peace officer making an 
arrest may orally summon as many persons as he considers necessary 
to aid him in making an arrest. " Section 380 protects the 
citizen who is requested by a peace officer to assist in making 
an arrest or in terminating an escape or attempted escape. 
As with the other sections of this chapter, this statute 
allows a person to act on appearances provided he does so 
reasonably. Thus, a citizen who has been called upon by a 
person he reasonably believes to be a peace officer to make 
an arrest is justified in using nondeadly force "when and to 
the e�tent that he reasonably believes it to be necessary to 
carry out the peace officer's direction." Deadly force 
may only be used when the citizen is directed by the officer to 
use such force. If the citizen believes the peace officer is 
not justified in using force under the circumstances, the use 
of force by the citizen would not be justified. 
IX. Section 11.81.390. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF FORCE BY PRIVATE
PERSON IN MAKING AN ARREST OR TERMINATING AN ESCAPE 
The use of nondeadly force by a private person in making an 
arrest or terminating an escape or attempted escape from custody is 
justified when the citizen reasonably believes the arrestee 
has committed a misdemeanor in his presence or a felony, regard­
less of whether the felony was committed in his presence. Deadly 
force may be used when he reasonably believes the suspect has 
committed a felony which involved the use of force against a 
person or is escaping or has escaped from custody while in 
possession of a firearm. 
X. Section 11.81.400. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF FORCE IN RESISTING
OR INTERFERING WITH ARREST 
Ordinarily a person may not resist or interfere with :•n 
unlawful arrest. However, the Code provides two exceptions to 
this rule. Under subsection (a) (1) a person may resist or inter­
fere with an unlawful.arrest if the peace officer is using ex­
cessive force in making the arrest. In allowing resistance 
under such circumstances the Code is consistent with existing 
law. See, Gray v. State, 463 P. 2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970). 
Note that subsection (b) provides that the amount of force used 
in resisting the arrest may not exceed the amount of force that 
would be authorized in self defense. For example, if the peace 
officer is using excessive nondeadly force in making the arrest, 
only nondeadly force may be used in resisting the arrest. 
Subsection (a) (2) proviqes a limited right to use nondeadly 
force in resisting (but not in interfering with) an unlawful 
arrest. This provision is necessary since the crime of resisting 
arrest, § 11. 56.700, is committed when a person uses ·force against 
an officer. The definition of force (§ 11.81. 900 (b) (22)) is broad 
enough to cover virtually all physical resistance to an arrest. 
To lawfully resist an unlawful arrest three conditions must 
be met: (1) the arrest must in fact be unlawful, (2) the resister .._... 
must know the arrest to be unlawful, and (3) deadly force may not 
be used. One example of a situation in which nondeadly force 
would be justified is this: a peace officer requests a bribe 
from a citizen. The citizen refuses and the officer places the 
citizen under arrest for disorderly conduct. Under these circum­
stances, the citizen may use nondeadly force in resisting the arrest. • 
XI. Section 11.81. 410. USE OF FORCE BY GUARDS
Subsection (a) allows guards and peace officers employed
in correctional facilities to use reasonable and appropriate 
nondeadly force to maintain order in the facility if the use of 
133.
nondeadly force has been authorized by regulations adopted by 
the Department of Health and Social Services. 
Because of the danger to society from escapes from cor­
rectional facilities is greater than the danger posed by the 
defeat of an arrest on the street, subsection (b), subject to the 
limitation in subsection (c), provides that a guard or peace 
officer employed in a correctional facility or a peace officer 
in the immediate vicinity of the facility at the time of the 
escape may use deadly force "when and to the extent he 
reasonably believes it necessary to terminate the escape or attempted 
escape of a prisoner from a correctional facility." Subsection 
(c) provides that only nondeadly force may be used to terminate 
a correctional facility escape if the person knew that the escapee 
was a misdemeanant and did not believe he was armed with a firearm. 
II. Section 11.81.420. JUSTIFICATION: PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC 
DUTY 
This section provides the defense of justification to 
all prosecutions under the Code if the chargeable conduct is 
required or authorized by law, judicial decree, judgment or 
order. The Code provision must be read in conjunction with 
the other, more specific, sections of the justification chapter 
which are intended to be controlling if applicable even though 
the conduct in question involves the performance of public duty. 
For example, § 370 specifies the circumstances when a peace 
officer may use deadly force in making an arrest. Section 
420 does not expand that authority. Rather§ 370 explains the 
application of§ 420 in a very specific circumstance. 
Subsection (a) provides that the laws and court orders, 
decrees or judgments which impose a duty or grant a privilege 
to act may be followed without incurring criminal liability. 
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broken down in the execution of a search warrant (AS 12. 35. 040) 
the officer has not committed criminal mischief in doing so. 
Under subsection (a), the conduct must in fact be authorized 
by" law or judicial order; the actor's reasonable though mistaken, 
belief is not sufficient to establish the defense. Subsection 
(b) provides two exceptions when the actor has a reasonable 
belief that the conduct is required or authorized. The first in­
volves a person who acts upon a court order that is defective for 
lack of jurisdiction but is reasonably believed to be authoritativP. 
The second involves a person called upon by a peace officer 
for assistnace that the person reasonably believes to be lawful. 
XIII. Section 11. 81. 430. JUSTIFICATION: USE OF FORCE; SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
This provision describes five situations when the use of 
reasonable nondeadly force is justified based on the relation­
ship between the actor and the person upon whom force was used. 
It must be emphasized that while the term "nondeadly force" in­
cludes all force short of the deadly variety, the degree of 
force used must, in all cases, be reasonable under the circum­
stances. If excessive force, even though nondeadly, is used, 
the conduct will not be justified. See generally § I, supra. 
Subsection (a) (1) allows parents, guardians and others en­
trusted with the care and supervision of a minor or incompetent 
to use reasonable and appropriate nondeadly force when and to 
the extent reasonably necessary to promote the welfare of the 
minor or incompetent person (defined in § ll. 81. 900 (b) (26)). The 
person who uses the force must also establish the person's incompet­
ency under subsection (b). 
Subsection (a) (2) allows a teacher to use nondeadly force 
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upon a student in limited situations. The subsection prohibits 
the use of any force in the absence of a school regulation 
and the decision of the school principal to allow it. Thus, 
the detailed regulation of situations where physical force 
is allowable, the extent of force to be used and procedural 
limitations on its use {such as who may administer the force) 
is left to school authorities within the context of each 
community. 
Subsection {a) (3) provides that a person responsible for 
the maintenance of order on a common carrier of passengers may 
use reasonable nondeadly force to maintain order on the common 
carrier. This provision, for example, would authorize a 
bus conductor to use reasonable force to eject an intoxicated 
person who is harassing other passengers. As with the other 
subsections of this provision, deadly force will be justifiable 
only if authorized by other provisions of this chapter. 
Subsection {a) (4) is new to Alaska and reflects a value 
only relatively recently given expression in the criminal law. 
It supports the general policy of the law to discourage suicides. 
Subsection {a) (5) authorizes the use of force when 
required for the administration of reasonably necessary medical 
treatment. Existing law contemplates that in emergency situa­
tions conduct that would otherwise constitute a criminal assault 
will not result in civil liability. See AS 09.65.090; AS 08.64.366. 
Paragraph {A) justifies the use of nondeadly force when 
administered with the consent of the patient, or if the patient 
is a minor or incompetent, the consent of a parent, guardian 
or other person entrusted with his care or supervision. 
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Justification is extended by paragraph (B) to the use of 
force without consent of the patient only in emergency situations 
when no noe competent to give consent is available under the 
circumstances, but when any reasonable person would give consent. 
XIV. Section 11.81. 440. DURESS 
Though the defense of duress is not now codified, it has 
been raised in at least two recent cases. Evans v. State, 550 
P.2d 830, 841 n.31 (Alaska 1976) ; State v. Webb, No. 74-1734 
Super. Ct., 3d Dist. 1974. Section 440 codifies the affirmative 
defense of duress. 
The defense is limited to situations where a person is 
coerced to act by "the use of unlawful force upon him or a 
third person." The defense does not require that the defendant 
suffer physical injury, that the imperiled victim be the defend­
ant rather than another, that the defendant commit some crime 
other than murder or that the injury portended be immediate 
in point of time. It is expected, however, that these factors 
will be given evidential weight along with other circumstances 
in determining whether a reasonable person in the defendant's 
situation would have been unable to resist the commission of 
the crime. 
Subsection (b) is intended as a guarantee against the 
claim of justification being raised by a defendant acting with 
accomplices, e.g., defendant argues that he fired a weapon 
during a hold-up only because his accomplice threatened to 
shoot him if he did not. In such an instance, it is likely 
that the jury would conclude that the defendant had recklessly 
placed himself in a situation "in which it [was] probable 
that he [would] be subject to duress. " 
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xv. Section 11. 81. 450. ENTRAPMENT 
The Code incorporates existing law by recognizing the 
"objective" approach to entrapment. See Grossman v. State, 
457 ·P. 2d 226 (Alaska 1969). In .classifying entrapment as an 
affirmative defense, which mus·t be established by the defendant 
,by a preponderance o·f the evidence, the Code provision is 
consistent with existing Alaska practice. Batson v. State, 
No. 1486 (Alaska, September 9, 1977) . 
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CHAPTER 81, ARTICLE 5. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
I. Section ll.81.900 (a) (1)- (4). DEFINITIONS 
As discussed in the Alaska Criminal Code Revision, Tena­
tive Draft, Part 2, Commentary at 8-11 (1977), the important 
area of culpable mental states is one of great confusion 
and uncertainty in existing law. The proliferation of 
culpable mental state terms coupled with their haphazard 
use hampers the interpretation of individual sections and 
frustrates one of the principal purposes of the mens rea 
concept: providing a structure for the classification 
of offenses according to their degree of blameworthiness. 
Additionally, some statutes are exposed to constitutional 
attack by their failure to specify a culpable mental state, 
or by their specification of an unconstitutional form of 
culpability. 
The Code addresses itself to these three problems 
by replacing the myriad of existing terms with a four-tiered 
framework of culpable mental states that clearly establishes 
levels of blameworthiness. Only four culpable mental states 
apply throughout the Code: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly ---­
and criminal negligence. The terms are defined in § 11.81.900 
(a) (1)- (4). Use of one or more of these terms, whether 
specifically included in a statute or implied through a rule 
of construction, should promote clarity and uniformity 
in the interpretation of individual sections and in the 
formulation of jury instructions. 
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The Code distinguishes between three elements of 
offenses to which the culpable mental states apply: 
1. the nature of the conduct; 
2. the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and 
3. the result of the conduct. 
The first element, conduct, involves the nature of 
the proscribed act or the manner in which the defendant 
acts. Kidnapping, for example, requires that one person 
restrain another. The conduct might be the locking of 
the only door to a windowless room. Knowingly is the 
culpable mental state applicable to conduct. The secorid 
element, circumstances surrounding the conduct, refers 
to a situation having a bearing on the actor's culpability. 
Kidnapping requires that the person inside the room not 
consent to being restrained. Lack of consent is an example 
of a circumstance surrounding the actor's· conduct, and is an 
element of the crime Knowingly, recklessly·, and criminal 
negligence are the culpable mental states associated with 
the existence of circumstances. The result of the actor's 
conduct constitutes the final element. Kidnapping can 
occur if the victim is exposed to a substantial risk of 
serious physical injury. Intentionally, recklessly and 
criminal negligence are the culpable mental states associated 
with results. 
a. Section 11.81. 900(a) (1)- (2). INTENTIONALLY AND 
KNOWINGLY 
When a statute in the Code provides that a defendant 
must intentionally cause a result, the state must prove that it 
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was the defendant's conscious objective to cause that 
result. This culpable mental state is comparable to the 
existing form of culpability commonly referred to as "specific 
intent." Bribery, for example, requires that the defendant 
confer a benefit upon a public servant with intent to 
influence him; the state must prove that it was the 
conscious objective of the defendant to cause the public 
servant to be influenced. 
Under the Code, knowledge requires an awareness on 
the part of the defendant that his conduct is of the nature 
described by the statute defining the offense or that 
the circumstances described by the statute exist. The 
definition also covers the situation where a person deliber­
ately avoids acquiring knowledge by closing his eyes (some­
times referred to as " wilful blindness") by providing that 
" when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an 
element of an offense, that knowledge is established if a 
person is aware of a substantial probability of its existence, 
unless he actually believes it does not exist. " 
Whether "knowing" should be defined subjectively or 
objectively was one of the issues most debated by the 
Subcommission. Under the Code the test for knowledge is 
a subjective one -- the defendant must actually be aware 
of the fact critical to culpability or of at least a 
substantial probability of its existence. A defendant who 
is unaware of the critical fact or of a substantial _prob­
ability of its existence does not "know, " regardless of 
whether a reasonable man would have been aware. Note, how­
ever, that a person who is not aware because he is volun-
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tarily intoxicated is held, nevertheless, to have acted 
"knowingly",� also§ VI, infra. 
b. Section ll.81.900(a) (3)-(4). RECKLESSLY AND
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 
When a statute in the Code provides that a 
person must recklessly cause a resul' t or disregard a 
circumstance, criminal liability will result if the de-
fendant "is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and un­
justifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circum­
stance exists." The test for recklessness is a subjective one --
the defendant must actually be aware of the risk. On the 
other hand, if criminal negligence is the applicable culpable 
mental state, the defendant will be criminally liable if he 
"fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the result will occur or that the circumstance exists." 
The test for criminal negligence is an objective one -- the 
defendant's culpability stems from his failure to perceive the 
Both terms require the risk to "be of such a nature and 
degree" that either the disregard of it {in the case of 
recklessness) or the failure to perceive it (in the case 
of criminal negligence) constitutes a "gross deviation" from 
the standard of conduct or care that "a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation." This definition of 
the applicable risk involved insures that proof of ordinary 
civil negligence will not give rise to criminal liability. 
As with the definition of "knowing-ly", an intoxicated 
person who is unaware of a risk which he would have been aware 
had he not been intoxicated is held to act "recklessly." Since 
"criminal negligence" is defined objectively, an intoxicated 
person would be held to act with criminal negligence if a 
reasonable person would have been aware of the risk. 
II. Section 11. 81.600. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY
Subsection (a) restates the basic principle of 
criminal law that a person is not subject to criminal 
sanctions unless he performs a voluntary act (defined 
in§ ll.81.900 (b) (56) ) or an omission (defined in§ 11.81.900 
(b) (36) ) .  Generally, some culpable mental state must
be established as to each element of an offense. Proof 
of culpability is unnecessary in three limited situations. 
First, no culpable mental state is required as to 
any element of an offense classified as a "violation" 
(defined in§ ll. 81.900 (b) (55) ) unless the statute defining 
the offense requires proof of culpability. Second, 
no culpable mental state is necessary as to any element 
of an offense when the statute defining that offense expressly 
designates it as one of "strict liability." Finally, proof 
of a culpable mental state is not required as to a 
particular element of an offense if "an intent to dispense 
with the culpable mental state requirement for that element 
clearly appears." In the article on s�xual assaril�, for 
example, �n intent to dispense with proof of defendant's 
knowledge that his victim was under thirteen is apparent. 
See, 11.41. 445 (b) . 
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III. Section 11.81.610. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES WITH
RESPECT TO CULPABILITY 
This section includes three important rules of 
construction to be applied in determining which culpable 
mental state must be proven as to each element of an offense. 
The first provides that when only one culpable mental state 
appears in a statute defining an offense, "it is presumed to 
apply to every element of the offense, unless an intent to 
limit its application clearly appears." 
Under subsection (b), if a statute does not specify 
any culpable mental state, conduct is required to be engaged 
in "knowingly" and results and circumstances are required to 
be engaged in "recklessly." "Criminal negligence" will not 
apply unless the term is expressly included in the statute 
defining the offense. 
The final rule of construction states the uncon­
troversial principle that when a higher degree of culp­
ability than necessary is established, the requirement 
of culpability is satisfied. If, for example, a statute 
defining an offense requires that a prohibited result be 
recklessly caused, proof that the result was intentionally 
caused will also establish the offense. 
IV. Section 11.81.615. OFFENSES DEFINED BY AGE OR VALUE
This section has been included in the Code to insure
that a prosecution can be brought when a reasonable doubt 
exists with respect to the value of property or services or 
the age of the victim between two degrees of an offense, but 
where there is no resonable doubt with respect to either element 
in terms of the lower degree of offense. For example, if 
144.
Subsection (b) (3) recognizes that conduct is justified 
if the defendant reasonably, though mistakenly, believed 
circumstances existed that supported a defense of justification 
as provided by Chapter 81, Article 4. 
VI. Section 11.81.630. INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE
This section is intended to restate existing law
and provides that while voluntary intoxication ("intoxicated" 
is defined in§ ll.81.900(b) (27) to include intoxication from 
drugs as we�l as alcohol) is not a defense to an offense, 
evidence that a defendant was intoxicated may be offered 
whenever it is relevant to negate an element of an offense 
that requires that a defendant intentionally cause a result. 145. 
SECTION 11 - ARREST AUTHORITY 
This section amends existing AS 12. 25. 030 by providing 
authority for peace officers to make probable cause arrests 
for misdemeanor assaults committed between members of the 
same household. Not that this authority is limited to assaults 
under AS ll. 4 1. 230 (a) (1). That provision covers the intentional 
or reckless causing of physical injury. Merely placing a person 
in fear of such injury does ·not give rise to the authority to 
make probable cause misdemeanor arrests. 
While this provision was drafted to provide one alter­
native in dealing with the problem of spouse abuse, it is 
broader than that. The term "household" is defined in sub­
section (b) as the "social unit comprised of those living to­
gether in the same dwelling. " Thus, in addition to protecting 
spouses, the section would also apply, for example, to the 
mother-in-law who is assaulted by her son-in-law and the person 
who is beaten up by the person he or she is living with. 
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should read "public from conduct now only II . . . .  
II 
6. Page 66, paragraph 2, line 1 should read: Subsection (a) (1) applies . 
7. Page 66, paragraph 4, line 1 should read: Subsection (a) (2) � provi.des 
8. Page 66, paragraph 4, line 3 should read: Subsection (a) (3) extends 
9. Page 66, paragraph 4, last line should read: . definitions in 
§ ll. 81. 900(b)(4) and (6). 
10. Page 70, Roman m.1rreral III should read 
11. Page 82, paragraph 2, line 10 should read: 
. GRATUITIES. 
give rise to criminal 
12. Page 85, paragraph 3: i.e. , on line 2 and 4 should read e.g. , . 
13. Page 96, paragraph 2, line 8: after "apply" delete ranainder of line 
8 ,  add "the" after "if'' on line 9. Cb line 10, change i.e. , to e.g. , . 
14. Page 110, paragraph 1, line 2: after "enterprise" , other than a 
place of prostitution, or who pro-. 
15. Page 111, paragraph 2, line 7 should read: 
provision dispensing with corroboration in 
-- ---�--:----:----:---...,.....--
16. Page 113, line 4: change i.e. , to e.g:;. 
consistent with the Code 
17. Page 117, second paragraph, line 5: "penalities" should be spelled 
penalties. 
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18. Page 117, third paragraph, line 3: after "in" add"§". 
19. Page 119, last line: change i.e. , to e. g.,. 
20. Page 124, third paragraph, line 8: ''misdernenaor" should be spelled 
misdemeanor. 
21. Page 125, third paragraph, line 12: ''burglarer" should be spelled 
burglar. 
22. Page 130, third paragraph, line 6: after felony, ''had" should read has .
23. Page 133, paragraph 3, last line: add: "In allowing the citizen to use 
nondeadly force tmder these circumstances, the Code provision is contrary 
to the rule formulated in Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969)". 
24. Page 135, paragraph 2, last line: "assistnace" should be spelled 
assistance. 
25. Page 141, paragraph 2, line 4: after "exist." add: "It is not required 
that the defendant know that his conduct is prohibited by law. See 
§ V, infra. 11 
26. Page 145, paragraph 2, line 3: after "v. U.S. 11 add 212. 
27. Page 151, paragraph 1, line 3: after "See" replace "AS" with §. 
28. Page 151, paragraph 2, line 7: after "Assess", add-. 
29. Page 154, line 3: "provision" should be changed to tenn. 
30. Page 155, line 1: change "six" to five. Paragraph 1, line 8, after 
"imprisonment." See should be tmderlined. 
31. Page 159, paragraph 4, line 3 : after ''tenn'' add: for factors in 
mitigation. 
32. Page 160, second to the last line: "consicered" should be spelled 
considered. 
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